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IOWA, PETITIONER v. FELIPE EDGARDO TOVAR
No. 02-1541
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
2004 U.S. LEXIS 1837
January 21, 2004, Argued
March 8, 2004, Decided

NOTICE: [*1]
The LEXIS pagination of this document is subject to change pending release of the final published version.
PRIOR HISTORY: ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA. State v.
Tovar, 656 N. W.2d 112, 2003 Iowa Sup. LEXIS 32 (Iowa, 2003)
DISPOSITION: Reversed and remanded.
LexisNexis (TM) HEADNOTES - Core Concepts:

SYLLABUS: At respondent Tovar's November 1996 arraignment for operating a motor vehicle under the
influence of alcohol (OWI), in response to the trial court's questions, Tovar affirmed that he wanted to
represent himself and to plead guilty. Conducting the guilty plea colloquy required by the Iowa Rules of
Criminal Procedure, the court explained that, if Tovar pleaded not guilty, he would be entitled to a speedy
and public jury trial where he would have the right to counsel who could help him select a jury, question
and cross-examine witnesses, present evidence, and make arguments on his behalf. By pleading guilty, the
court cautioned, Tovar would give up his [*2] right to a trial and his rights at that trial to be represented by
counsel, to remain silent, to the presumption of innocence, and to subpoena witnesses and compel their
testimony. The court then informed Tovar of the maximum and minimum penalties for an OWI conviction,
and explained that, before accepting a guilty plea, the court had to assure itself that Tovar was in fact guilty
of the charged offense. To that end, the court informed Tovar of the two elements of the OWI charge: The
defendant must have (1) operated a motor vehicle in Iowa (2) while intoxicated. Tovar confirmed, first, that
on the date in question, he was operating a motor vehicle in Iowa and, second, that he did not dispute the
result of the intoxilyzer test showing his blood alcohol level exceeded the legal limit nearly twice over. The
court then accepted his guilty plea and, at a hearing the next month, imposed the minimum sentence of two
days in jail and a fine. In 1998, Tovar was again charged with OWI, this time as a second offense, an
aggravated misdemeanor under Iowa law. Represented by counsel in that proceeding, he pleaded guilty. In
2000, Tovar was charged with third-offense OWI, a class "D" felony under [*3] Iowa law. Again
represented by counsel, Tovar pleaded not guilty to the felony charge. Counsel moved to preclude use of
Tovar's first (1996) OWI conviction to enhance his 2000 offense from an aggravated misdemeanor to a
third-offense felony. Tovar maintained that his 1996 waiver of counsel was invalid ~ not fully knowing,
intelligent, and voluntary — because he was never made aware by the court of the dangers and disadvantages
of self-representation. The trial court denied the motion, found Tovar guilty, and sentenced him on the OWI
third-offense charge. The Iowa Court of Appeals affirmed, but the Supreme Court of Iowa reversed and
remanded for entry of judgment without consideration of Tovar's first OWI conviction. Holding that the
colloquy preceding acceptance of Tovar's 1996 guilty plea had been constitutionally inadequate, Iowa's high
court ruled, as here at issue, that two warnings not given to Tovar are essential to the "knowing and
intelligent" waiver of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel at the plea stage: The defendant must be advised
specifically that waiving counsel's assistance in deciding whether to plead guilty (1) entails the risk that a
viable defense will be overlooked [*4] and (2) deprives him of the opportunity to obtain an independent
opinion on whether, under the facts and applicable law, it is wise to plead guilty.

Held: Neither warning ordered by the Iowa Supreme Court is mandated by the Sixth Amendment. The
constitutional requirement is satisfied when the trial court informs the accused of the nature of the charges
against him, of his right to be counseled regarding his plea, and of the range of allowable punishments
attendant upon the entry of a guilty plea. Pp. 8-15.
(a) The Sixth Amendment secures to a defendant facing incarceration the right to counsel at all "critical
stages" of the criminal process, see, e.g., Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 170, 88 L. Ed. 2d 481, 106 S. Ct.
477, including a plea hearing, White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59, 60, 10 L. Ed. 2d 193, 83 S Ct. 1050 (per
curiam). Because Tovar received a two-day prison term for his first OWI conviction, he had a right to
counsel both at the plea stage and at trial had he elected to contest the charge. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407
US. 25, 34, 37, 32 L. Ed. 2d 530, 92 S. Ct. 2006. Although an accused may choose to forgo representation,
any waiver of the right to counsel must be knowing, voluntary, and [*5] intelligent, see Johnson v. Zerbst,
304 U.S. 458, 464, 82 L. Ed. 1461, 58 S. Ct. 1019. The information a defendant must possess in order to
make an intelligent election depends on a range of case-specific factors, including his education or
sophistication, the complex or easily grasped nature of the charge, and the stage of the proceeding. See
Johnson, 304 U.S., at 464, 82 L. Ed. 1461, 58 S. Ct. 1019. Although warnings of the pitfalls of proceeding
to trial uncounseled must be "rigorously" conveyed, Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285, 298, 101 L. Ed. 2d
261, 108 S. Ct. 2389; see Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835, 45 L. Ed. 2d 562, 95 S. Ct. 2525, a less
searching or formal colloquy may suffice at earlier stages of the criminal process, 487 U.S., at 299, 101 L.
Ed. 2d 261, 108 S. Ct. 2389. In Patterson, this Court described a pragmatic approach to right-to-counsel
waivers, one that asks "what purposes a lawyer can serve at the particular stage of the proceedings in
question, and what assistance [counsel] could provide to an accused at that stage." Id., at 298, 101 L. Ed. 2d
261, 108 S. Ct. 2389. Less rigorous warnings are required pretrial because, at that stage, "the full dangers
and disadvantages of self-representation . . . are less substantial and more obvious [*6] to an accused than
they are at trial." Id, at 299, 101 L. Ed. 2d 261, 108 S. Ct. 2389. Pp. 8-11.
(b) The Sixth Amendment does not compel the two admonitions ordered by the Iowa Supreme Court. "The
law ordinarily considers a waiver knowing, intelligent, and sufficiently aware if the defendant fully
understands the nature of the right and how it would likely apply in general in the circumstances . . . . "
United States v. Ruiz, 536 US 622, 629, 153 L. Ed. 2d 586, 122 S. Ct. 2450. Even if the defendant lacked a
full and complete appreciation of all of the consequences flowing from his waiver, the State may
nevertheless prevail if it shows that the information provided to the defendant satisfied the constitutional
minimum. Patterson, 487 U.S., at 294, 101 L. Ed. 2d 261, 108 S Ct. 2389. The Iowa high court gave
insufficient consideration to this Court's guiding decisions. In prescribing scripted admonitions and holding
them necessary in every guilty plea instance, that court overlooked this Court's observations that the
information a defendant must have to waive counsel intelligently will depend upon the particular facts and
circumstances in each case, Johnson, 304 U.S., at 464, 82 L. Ed. 2d 1461, 58 S. Ct. 1019. Moreover, as
Tovar acknowledges, [*7] in a collateral attack on an uncounseled conviction, it is the defendant's burden
to prove that he did not competently and intelligently waive his right to counsel. Tovar has never claimed
that he did not fully understand the 1996 OWI charge or the range of punishment for that crime prior to
pleading guilty. He has never "articulated with precision" the additional information counsel could have
provided, given the simplicity of the charge. See Patterson, 487 U.S., at 294, 101 L. Ed. 2d 261, 108 S. Ct.
2389. Nor does he assert that he was unaware of his right to be counseled prior to and at his arraignment.
Before this Court, he suggests only that he may have been under the mistaken belief that he had a right to
counsel at trial, but not if he was, instead, going to plead guilty. Given "the particular facts and
circumstances surrounding [this] case," Johnson, 304 U.S., at 464, 82 L. Ed. 2d 1461, 58 S. Ct. 1019, it is
far from clear that warnings of the kind required by the Iowa Supreme Court would have enlightened
Tovar's decision whether to seek counsel or to represent himself. In a case so straightforward, the two
admonitions at issue might confuse or mislead a defendant more than they would inform him, [*8] i.e., the
warnings might be misconstrued to convey that a meritorious defense exists or that the defendant could
plead to a lesser charge, when neither prospect is a realistic one. If a defendant delays his plea in the vain
hope that counsel could uncover a tenable basis for contesting or reducing the criminal charge, the prompt
disposition of the case will be impeded, and the resources of either the State (if the defendant is indigent) or
the defendant himself (if he is financially ineligible for appointed counsel) will be wasted. States are free to
adopt by statute, rule, or decision any guides to the acceptance of an uncounseled plea they deem useful, but
the Federal Constitution does not require the two admonitions here in controversy. Pp. 11-15.

656 N. W. 2d 112, reversed and remanded.
JUDGES: GINSBURG, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
OPINIONBY: GINSBURG
OPINION:
JUSTICE GINSBURG delivered the opinion of the Court.
The Sixth Amendment safeguards to an accused who faces incarceration the right to counsel at all
critical stages of the criminal process. Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 170, 88 L. Ed. 2d 481, 106 S. Ct.
477 (1985); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 224, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1149, 87 S Ct. 1926 (1967). [*9] The
entry of a guilty plea, whether to a misdemeanor or a felony charge, ranks as a "critical stage" at which the
right to counsel adheres. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 34, 32 L. Ed. 2d 530, 92 S. Ct. 2006 (1972);
White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59, 60, 10 L. Ed. 2d 193, 83 S. Ct. 1050 (1963) (per curiam). Waiver of the
right to counsel, as of constitutional rights in the criminal process generally, must be a "knowing, intelligent
act done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances." Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742,
748, 25 L. Ed. 2d 747, 90 S. Ct. 1463 (1970). This case concerns the extent to which a trial judge, before
accepting a guilty plea from an uncounseled defendant, must elaborate on the right to representation.
Beyond affording the defendant the opportunity to consult with counsel prior to entry of a plea and to
be assisted by counsel at the plea hearing, must the court, specifically: (1) advise the defendant that
"waiving the assistance of counsel in deciding whether to plead guilty [entails] the risk that a viable defense
will be overlooked"; and (2) "admonish" the defendant "that by waiving his right to an attorney he will lose
the opportunity to obtain an independent opinion on [*10] whether, under the facts and applicable law, it is
wise to plead guilty"? 656 N. W.2d 112, 121 (Iowa 2003). The Iowa Supreme Court held both warnings
essential to the "knowing and intelligent" waiver of the Sixth Amendment right to the assistance of counsel.
Ibid.
We hold that neither warning is mandated by the Sixth Amendment. The constitutional requirement is
satisfied when the trial court informs the accused of the nature of the charges against him, of his right to be
counseled regarding his plea, and of the range of allowable punishments attendant upon the entry of a guilty
plea.
I
On November 2, 1996, respondent Felipe Edgardo Tovar, then a 21-year-old college student, was
arrested in Ames, Iowa, for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol (OWI). See Iowa
Code § 321J.2 (1995). nl An intoxilyzer test administered the night of Tovar's arrest showed he had a
blood alcohol level of 0.194. App. 24. The arresting officer informed Tovar of his rights under Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U. S 436, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694, 86 S. Ct. 1602 (1966). Tovar signed a form stating that he waived
those rights and agreed to answer questions. Iowa State Univ. Dept. of Public [*11] Safety, OWI
Supplemental Report 3 (Nov. 2, 1996), Lodging of Petitioner; Iowa State Univ. Dept. of Public Safety,
Rights Warnings (Nov. 2, 1996), Lodging of Petitioner.

nl "A person commits the offense of operating while intoxicated if the person operates a motor
vehicle in this state in either of the following conditions: a. While under the influence of an
alcoholic beverage . . . . 6. While having an alcohol concentration . . . of .10 or more." Iowa Code §
32112(1) (1995).
Some hours after his arrest, Tovar appeared before a judge in the Iowa District Court for Story County.
The judge indicated on the Initial Appearance form that Tovar appeared without counsel and waived
application for court-appointed counsel. Initial Appearance in No. OWCR 23989 (Nov. 2, 1996), Lodging
of Petitioner. The judge also marked on the form's checklist that Tovar was "informed of the charge and his
. . . rights and received a copy of the Complaint." Ibid. Arraignment was set for November 18, 1996. In the
interim, [*12] Tovar was released from jail.

At the November 18 arraignment, n2 the court's inquiries of Tovar began: "Mr. Tovar appears without
counsel and I see, Mr. Tovar, that you waived application for a court appointed attorney. Did you want to
represent yourself at today's hearing?" App. 8-9. Tovar replied: "Yes, sir." Id., at 9. The court soon after
asked: "How did you wish to plead?" Tovar answered: "Guilty." Ibid. Tovar affirmed that he had not been
promised anything or threatened in any way to induce him to plead guilty. Id., at 13-14.

n2 Tovar appeared in court along with four other individuals charged with misdemeanor
offenses. App. 6-10. The presiding judge proposed to conduct the plea proceeding for the five cases
jointly, and each of the individuals indicated he did not object to that course of action. Id., at 11.
Conducting the guilty plea colloquy required by the Iowa Rules of Criminal Procedure, see Iowa Rule
Crim. Proc. 8 (1992), n3 the court explained that, if Tovar pleaded not guilty, [*13] he would be entitled
to a speedy and public trial by jury, App. 15, and would have the right to be represented at that trial by an
attorney, who "could help [Tovar] select a jury, question and cross-examine the State's witnesses, present
evidence, if any, in [his] behalf, and make arguments to the judge and jury on [his] behalf," id., at 16. By
pleading guilty, the court cautioned, "not only [would Tovar] give up [his] right to a trial [of any kind on the
charge against him], [he would] give up [his] right to be represented by an attorney at that trial." Ibid. The
court further advised Tovar that, if he entered a guilty plea, he would relinquish the right to remain silent at
trial, the right to the presumption of innocence, and the right to subpoena witnesses and compel their
testimony. Id., at 16-19.

n3 The Rule has since been renumbered 2.8.
Turning to the particular offense with which Tovar had been charged, the court informed him that an
OWI conviction carried a maximum penalty [*14] of a year in jail and a $ 1,000 fine, and a minimum
penalty of two days in jail and a $ 500 fine. Id., at 20. Tovar affirmed that he understood his exposure to
those penalties. Ibid. The court next explained that, before accepting a guilty plea, the court had to assure
itself that Tovar was in fact guilty of the charged offense. Id., at 21-22. To that end, the court informed
Tovar that the OWI charge had only two elements: first, on the date in question, Tovar was operating a
motor vehicle in the State of Iowa; second, when he did so, he was intoxicated. Id., at 23. Tovar confirmed
that he had been driving in Ames, Iowa, on the night he was apprehended and that he did not dispute the
results of the intoxilyzer test administered by the police that night, which showed that his blood alcohol
level exceeded the legal limit nearly twice over. Id., at 23-24.
After the plea colloquy, the court asked Tovar if he still wished to plead guilty, and Tovar affirmed that
he did. Id., at 27-28. The court then accepted Tovar's plea, observing that there was "a factual basis" for it,
and that Tovar had made the plea "voluntarily, with a full understanding of [his] rights, [*15] [and]... of
the consequences of [pleading guilty]." Id., at 28.
On December 30, 1996, Tovar appeared for sentencing on the OWI charge n4 and, simultaneously, for
arraignment on a subsequent charge of driving with a suspended license. Id., at 45-46; see Iowa Code §
321J.21 (1995). n5 Noting that Tovar was again in attendance without counsel, the court inquired: "Mr.
Tovar, did you want to represent yourself at today's hearing or did you want to take some time to hire an
attorney to represent you?" App. 46. n6 Tovar replied that he would represent himself. Ibid. The court then
engaged in essentially the same plea colloquy on the suspension charge as it had on the OWI charge the
previous month. Id., at 48-51. After accepting Tovar's guilty plea on the suspension charge, the court
sentenced him on both counts: For the OWI conviction, the court imposed the minimum sentence of two
days in jail and a $ 500 fine, plus a surcharge and costs; for the suspension conviction, the court imposed a
$ 250 fine, plus a surcharge and costs. Id., at 55.

n4 At that stage, it was still open to Tovar to request withdrawal of his guilty plea on the OWI
charge and to substitute a plea of not guilty. See Iowa Rule Crim. Proc. 8(2)(a) (1992). [*16]

n5 In order to appear at the OWI arraignment, Tovar drove to the courthouse despite the
suspension of his license; he was apprehended en route home. App. 50, 53.
n6 Prior to asking Tovar whether he wished to hire counsel, the court noted that Tovar had
applied for a court-appointed attorney but that his application had been denied because he was
financially dependent upon his parents. Id., at 46. Tovar does not here challenge the absence of
counsel at sentencing.
On March 16, 1998, Tovar was convicted of OWI for a second time. He was represented by counsel in
that proceeding, in which he pleaded guilty. Record 60; see App. to Pet. for Cert. 24, n. 1.
On December 14, 2000, Tovar was again charged with OWI, this time as a third offense, see Iowa
Code § 321J.2 (1999), and additionally with driving while license barred, see § 321.561. Iowa law
classifies first-offense OWI as a serious misdemeanor and second-offense OWI as an aggravated
misdemeanor. § § 321J.2(2)(a)-(b). Third-offense OWI, and any OWI offenses thereafter, rank as class
"D" felonies. § 321J.2(2)(c). Represented [*17] by an attorney, Tovar pleaded not guilty to both December
2000 charges. Record 55.
In March 2001, through counsel, Tovar filed a Motion for Adjudication of Law Points; then7 motion
urged that Tovar's first OWI conviction, in 1996, could not be used to enhance the December 2000 OWI
charge from a second-offense aggravated misdemeanor to a third-offense felony. App. 3-5. n8 Significantly,
Tovar did not allege that he was unaware at the November 1996 arraignment of his right to counsel prior to
pleading guilty and at the plea hearing. Instead, he maintained that his 1996 waiver of counsel was invalid —
not "full knowing, intelligent, and voluntary" — because he "was never made aware by the court. .. of the
dangers and disadvantages of self-representation." Id., at 3-4.

n7 See Iowa Rule Crim. Proc. 10(2) (1992) ("Any defense, objection, or request which is
capable of determination without the trial of the general issue may be raised before trial by
motion."); State v. Wilt, 333 N. W.2d 457, 460 (Iowa 1983) (approving use of motions for
adjudication of law points under Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 10(2) where material facts are
undisputed). [* 18]

n8 Tovar conceded that the 1998 OWI conviction could be used for enhancement purposes.
Record 60.
The court denied Tovar's motion in May 2001, explaining: "Where the offense is readily understood by
laypersons and the penalty is not unduly severe, the duty of inquiry which is imposed upon the court is only
that which is required to assure an awareness of [the] right to counsel and a willingness to proceed without
counsel in the face of such awareness." App. to Pet. for Cert. 36-37 (brackets in original). Tovar then
waived his right to a jury trial and was found guilty by the court of both the OWI third-offense charge and
driving while license barred. Id., at 33. Four months after that adjudication, Tovar was sentenced. On the
OWI third-offense charge, he received a 180-day jail term, with all but 30 days suspended, three years of
probation, and a $ 2,500 fine plus surcharges and costs. App. 70-71. For driving while license barred, Tovar
received a 30-day jail term, to run concurrently with the OWI sentence, and a suspended $ 500 fine. Id., at
71.
The Iowa Court of Appeals affirmed, [*19] App. to Pet. for Cert. 23-30, but the Supreme Court of
Iowa, by a 4 to 3 vote, reversed and remanded for entry of judgment without consideration of Tovar's first
OWI conviction, 656 N. W.2d 112 (2003). Iowa's highest court acknowledged that "the dangers of
proceeding pro se at a guilty plea proceeding will be different than the dangers of proceeding pro se at a
jury trial, [therefore] the inquiries made at these proceedings will also be different." Id., at 119. The court
nonetheless held that the colloquy preceding acceptance of Tovar's 1996 guilty plea had been
constitutionally inadequate, and instructed dispositively:

"[A] defendant such as Tovar who chooses to plead guilty without the assistance of an attorney must be
advised of the usefulness of an attorney and the dangers of self-representation in order to make a knowing
and intelligent waiver of his right to counsel.... The trial judge [must] advise the defendant generally that
there are defenses to criminal charges that may not be known by laypersons and that the danger in waiving
the assistance of counsel in deciding whether to plead guilty is the risk that a viable defense will be
overlooked. [*20] The defendant should be admonished that by waiving his right to an attorney he will lose
the opportunity to obtain an independent opinion on whether, under the facts and applicable law, it is wise
to plead guilty. In addition, the court must ensure the defendant understands the nature of the charges
against him and the range of allowable punishments." Id., at 121. n9

n9 The dissenting justices criticized the majority's approach as "rigid" and out of line with the
pragmatic approach this Court described in Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285, 298, 101 L. Ed. 2d
261, 108 S. Ct. 2389 (1988). 656 N. W. 2d, at 122. They noted that, in addition to advice concerning
the constitutional rights a guilty plea relinquishes, Tovar was "made fully aware of the penal
consequences that might befall him if he went forward without counsel and pleaded guilty." Ibid.
We granted certiorari, 539 U.S. , 156 L. Ed. 2d 703, 124 S. Ct. 44(2003), in view of the division of
opinion on the requirements the Sixth Amendment imposes for waiver of counsel [*21] at a plea hearing,
compare, e.g., United States v. Akins, 276 F.3d 1141, 1146-1147 (CA9 2002), with State v. Cashman, 491
N. W.2d 462, 465-466 (S. D. 1992), and we now reverse the judgment of the Iowa Supreme Court.
II
The Sixth Amendment secures to a defendant who faces incarceration the right to counsel at all "critical
stages" of the criminal process. See, e.g., Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S., at 170, 88 L. Ed. 2d 481, 106 S. Ct.
477\ United States v. Wade, 388 U.S., at 224, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1149, 87 S. Ct. 1926. A plea hearing qualifies as
a "critical stage." White v. Maryland, 373 U.S., at 60, 10 L. Ed. 2d 193, 83 S. Ct. 1050. Because Tovar
received a two-day prison term for his 1996 OWI conviction, he had a right to counsel both at the plea stage
and at trial had he elected to contest the charge. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S., at 34, 37, 32 L. Ed. 2d
530, 92 S. Ct. 2006.
A person accused of crime, however, may choose to forgo representation. While the Constitution
"does not force a lawyer upon a defendant," Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 279, 87
L. Ed. 268, 63 S. Ct. 236 (1942), it does require that any waiver of the right to counsel be knowing,
voluntary, and intelligent, [*22] see Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 US 458, 464, 82 L. Ed 1461, 58 S Ct. 1019
(1938). Tovar contends that his waiver of counsel in November 1996, at his first OWI plea hearing, was
insufficiently informed, and therefore constitutionally invalid. In particular, he asserts that the trial judge did
not elaborate on the value, at that stage of the case, of an attorney's advice and the dangers of selfrepresentation in entering a plea. Brief for Respondent 15. nlO

nlO The United States as amicus curiae reads our decision in Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 59
L. Ed. 2d 383, 99 S. Ct. 1158 (1979), to hold that a constitutionally defective waiver of counsel in a
misdemeanor prosecution, although warranting vacation of any term of imprisonment, affords no
ground for disturbing the underlying conviction. Amicus accordingly contends that the Constitution
should not preclude use of an uncounseled misdemeanor conviction to enhance the penalty for a
subsequent offense, regardless of the validity of the prior waiver. See Brief for United States as
Amicus Curiae 11, n. 3. The State, however, does not contest the Iowa Supreme Court's
determination that a conviction obtained without an effective waiver of counsel cannot be used to
enhance a subsequent charge. See ibid. We therefore do not address arguments amicus advances
questioning that premise. See also id., at 29, n. 12.
[*23]
We have described a waiver of counsel as intelligent when the defendant "knows what he is doing and
his choice is made with eyes open." Adams, 317 U.S., at 279, 87 L. Ed. 268, 63 S. Ct. 236. We have not,
however, prescribed any formula or script to be read to a defendant who states that he elects to proceed

without counsel. The information a defendant must possess in order to make an intelligent election, our
decisions indicate, will depend on a range of case-specific factors, including the defendant's education or
sophistication, the complex or easily grasped nature of the charge, and the stage of the proceeding. See
Johnson, 304 U.S., at 464, 82 L. Ed. 1461, 58 S. Ct. 1019.
As to waiver of trial counsel, we have said that before a defendant may be allowed to proceed pro se,
he must be warned specifically of the hazards ahead. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 45 L. Ed. 2d 562,
95 S. Ct. 2525 (1975), is instructive. The defendant in Faretta resisted counsel's aid, preferring to represent
himself. The Court held that he had a constitutional right to self-representation. In recognizing that right,
however, we cautioned: "Although a defendant need not himself have the skill and experience of a lawyer in
order competently [*24] and intelligently to choose self-representation, he should be made aware of the
dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, so that the record will establish that he knows what he is
doing
" Id., at 835, 45 L. Ed. 2d 562, 95 S. Ct. 2525 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Later, in Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285, 101 L. Ed. 2d 261, 108 S. Ct. 2389 (1988), we elaborated
on "the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation" to which Faretta referred. "At trial," we
observed, "counsel is required to help even the most gifted layman adhere to the rules of procedure and
evidence, comprehend the subtleties of voir dire, examine and cross-examine witnesses effectively . . .,
object to improper prosecution questions, and much more." 487 U.S., at 299, n. 13, 101 L. Ed. 2d 261, 108
S. Ct. 2389. Warnings of the pitfalls of proceeding to trial without counsel, we therefore said, must be
"rigorously" conveyed. Id., at 298, 101 L. Ed. 2d 261, 108 S. Ct. 2389. We clarified, however, that at
earlier stages of the criminal process, a less searching or formal colloquy may suffice. Id., at 299, 101 L.
Ed. 2d 261, 108 S. Ct. 2389.
Patterson concerned postindictment questioning by police and prosecutor. At that stage of the case, we
held, the warnings required [*25] by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 US 436, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694, 86 S Ct. 1602
(1966), adequately informed the defendant not only of his Fifth Amendment rights, but of his Sixth
Amendment right to counsel as well. 487 U.S., at 293, 101 L. Ed. 2d 261, 108 S Ct. 2389. Miranda
warnings, we said, effectively convey to a defendant his right to have counsel present during questioning. In
addition, they inform him of the "ultimate adverse consequence" of making uncounseled admissions, i.e.,
his statements may be used against him in any ensuing criminal proceeding. 487 U.S., at 293, 101 L. Ed. 2d
261, 108 S. Ct. 2389. The Miranda warnings, we added, "also sufficed . . . to let [the defendant] know what
a lawyer could 'do for him,'" namely, advise him to refrain from making statements that could prove
damaging to his defense. 487 U.S., at 294, 101 L. Ed. 2d 261, 108 S. Ct. 2389.
Patterson describes a "pragmatic approach to the waiver question," one that asks "what purposes a
lawyer can serve at the particular stage of the proceedings in question, and what assistance he could provide
to an accused at that stage," in order "to determine the scope of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, and
the type of warnings and procedures that should be required before a waiver [*26] of that right will be
recognized." Id., at 298, 101 L. Ed. 2d 261, 108 S. Ct. 2389. We require less rigorous warnings pretrial,
Patterson explained, not because pretrial proceedings are "less important" than trial, but because, at that
stage, "the full dangers and disadvantages of self-representation . . . are less substantial and more obvious to
an accused than they are at trial." Id., at 299, 101 L. Ed. 2d 261, 108 S. Ct. 2389 (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted).
In Tovar's case, the State maintains that, like the Miranda warnings we found adequate in Patterson,
Iowa's plea colloquy suffices both to advise a defendant of his right to counsel, and to assure that his guilty
plea is informed and voluntary. Brief for Petitioner 20; Tr. of Oral Arg. 3. The plea colloquy, according to
the State, "makes plain that an attorney's role would be to challenge the charge or sentence," and therefore
adequately conveys to the defendant both the utility of counsel and the dangers of self-representation. Brief
for Petitioner 25. Tovar, on the other hand, defends the precise instructions required by the Iowa Supreme
Court, see supra, at 7-8, as essential to a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent plea stage [*27] waiver of
counsel. Brief for Respondent 15.
To resolve this case, we need not endorse the State's position that nothing more than the plea colloquy
was needed to safeguard Tovar's right to counsel. Preliminarily, we note that there were some things more
in this case. Tovar first indicated that he waived counsel at his Initial Appearance, see supra, at 3, affirmed
that he wanted to represent himself at the plea hearing, see supra, at 3, and declined the court's offer of
"time to hire an attorney" at sentencing, when it was still open to him to request withdrawal of his plea, see
supra, at 4-5, and n. 4. Further, the State does not contest that a defendant must be alerted to his right to the

assistance of counsel in entering a plea See Brief for Petitioner 19 (acknowledging defendant's need to
know "retained or appointed counsel can assist" at the plea stage by "working on the issues of guilt and
sentencing") Indeed, the Iowa Supreme Court appeared to assume that Tovar was informed of his
entitlement to counsel's aid or, at least, to have pretermitted that issue See 656 N W 2d, at 117
Accordingly, the State presents a narrower question "Does the Sixth Amendment [*28] require a court to
give a rigid and detailed admonishment to a pro se defendant pleading guilty of the usefulness of an
attorney, that an attorney may provide an independent opinion whether it is wise to plead guilty and that
without an attorney the defendant risks overlooking a defense9" Pet for Cert l
Training on that question, we turn to, and reiterate, the particular language the Iowa Supreme Court
employed in announcing the warnings it thought the Sixth Amendment required "The trial judge [must]
advise the defendant generally that there are defenses to criminal charges that may not be known by
laypersons and that the danger in waiving the assistance of counsel in deciding whether to plead guilty is the
risk that a viable defense will be overlooked," 656 N W 2d, at 121, in addition, "the defendant should be
admonished that by waiving his right to an attorney he will lose the opportunity to obtain an independent
opinion on whether, under the facts and applicable law, it is wise to plead guilty," ibid Tovar did not
receive such advice, and the sole question before us is whether the Sixth Amendment compels the two
admonitions here in controversy [*29] nl 1 We hold it does not

nl 1 The Supreme Court of Iowa also held that "the court must ensure the defendant understands
the nature of the charges against him and the range of allowable punishments " 656 N W 2d, at 121
The parties do not dispute that Tovar was so informed
This Court recently explained, in reversing a lower court determination that a guilty plea was not
voluntary "The law ordinarily considers a waiver knowing, intelligent, and sufficiently aware if the
defendant fully understands the nature of the right and how it would likely apply in general in the
circumstances ~ even though the defendant may not know the specific detailed consequences of invoking
it " United States v Ruiz, 536 US 622, 629, 153 L Ed 2d 586, 122 S Ct 2450 (2002) (emphasis in
original) We similarly observed in Patterson "If [the defendant]
lacked a full and complete
appreciation of all of the consequences flowing from his waiver, it does not defeat the State's showing that
the information it provided [*30] to him satisfied the constitutional minimum " 487 US, at 294, 101 L Ed
2d 261, 108 S Ct 2389 (internal quotation marks omitted) The Iowa Supreme Court gave insufficient
consideration to these guiding decisions In prescribing scripted admonitions and holding them necessary in
every guilty plea instance, we further note, the Iowa high court overlooked our observations that the
information a defendant must have to waive counsel intelligently will "depend, in each case, upon the
particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case," Johnson, 304 U S, at 464, 82 L Ed 1461, 58 S
Ct 1019, supra, at 9
Moreover, as Tovar acknowledges, in a collateral attack on an uncounseled conviction, it is the
defendant's burden to prove that he did not competently and intelligently waive his right to the assistance of
counsel See Watts v State, 257 N W2d 70, 71 (Iowa 1977), Brief for Respondent 5, 26-27 In that light,
we note that Tovar has never claimed that he did not fully understand the charge or the range of punishment
for the crime prior to pleading guilty Further, he has never "articulated with precision" the additional
information counsel could have provided, given the simplicity of the [*31] charge See Patterson, 487 U S,
at 294, 101 L Ed 2d 261, 108 S Ct 2389, supra, at 4 Nor does he assert that he was unaware of his right
to be counseled prior to and at his arraignment Before this Court, he suggests only that he "may have been
under the mistaken belief that he had a right to counsel at trial, but not if he was merely going to plead
guilty " Brief for Respondent 16 (emphasis added) nl2

nl2 The trial court's comment that Tovar appeared without counsel at the arraignment and the
court's inquiry whether Tovar wanted to represent himself at that hearing, see App 8-9, hardly lend
support to Tovar's suggestion of what he "may have" believed See also id, at 46 (court's inquiry at
sentencing whether Tovar "wanted to take some time to hire an attorney"), Iowa Rule Cnm Proc 8
(2)(a) (1992) ("at any time before judgment," defendant may request withdrawal of guilty plea and
substitution of not guilty plea)

Given "the particular facts and circumstances surrounding [this] case," see Johnson, 304 U S, at 464,
82 L Ed 2d 1461, 58 S Ct 1019 [*32] it is far from clear that warnings of the kind required by the Iowa
Supreme Court would have enlightened Tovar's decision whether to seek counsel or to represent himself In
a case so straightforward, the United States as amicus curiae suggests, the admonitions at issue might
confuse or mislead a defendant more than they would inform him The warnings the Iowa Supreme Court
declared mandatory might be misconstrued as a veiled suggestion that a meritorious defense exists or that
the defendant could plead to a lesser charge, when neither prospect is a realistic one If a defendant delays
his plea in the vain hope that counsel could uncover a tenable basis for contesting or reducing the criminal
charge, the prompt disposition of the case will be impeded, and the resources of either the State (if the
defendant is indigent) or the defendant himself (if he is financially ineligible for appointed counsel) will be
wasted Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 9, 28-29, Tr of Oral Arg 20-21
We note, finally, that States are free to adopt by statute, rule, or decision any guides to the acceptance
of an uncounseled plea they deem useful See, e g, Alaska Rule Crim Proc 39(a) [*33] (2003), Fla Rule
Crim Proc 3 111(d) (2003), Md Ct Rule 4-215 (2002), Minn Rule Crim Proc 5 02 (2003), Pa Rule
Crim Proc 727, comment (2003) We hold only that the two admonitions the Iowa Supreme Court ordered
are not required by the Federal Constitution
***
For the reasons stated, the judgment of the Supreme Court of Iowa is reversed, and the case is
remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion
It is so ordered
Go To Full Text Opinion
Go to Supreme Court Bnef(s)
Go to Supreme Court Transcripts
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GREENWOOD, Judge:
11 Benjamin Frank Lucero (Petitioner) appeals the district court's
dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. He argues that
while he was before the Murray City Justice Court (Justice Court), he
was not properly advised of his constitutional right to counsel, and
consequently did not knowingly and voluntarily waive his right to
counsel before pleading guilty to driving under the influence of
alcohol (DUI) in violation of Utah Code Annotated section 41-6-44
(Supp. 2003). Petitioner argues that the record in the Justice Court
is insufficient to allow a determination of whether the required
colloquy between the Justice Court and Petitioner occurred and that
the trial court should not have considered evidence outside the
record.
12 The Justice Court responds by first arguing that neither the
district court nor this court has jurisdiction to hear this case
because Petitioner failed to file a timely appeal to the district
court for a trial de novo. The Justice Court further argues that if
there is jurisdiction there was sufficient evidence on the record and
through proffered and sworn testimony, for the district court to
conclude that Petitioner was advised of his rights, and properly
waived his right to counsel. We affirm the district court's decision,
but on other grounds.

BACKGROUND
13 Petitioner was charged in the Justice Court-^- with DUI, a class
B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Annotated section 41-6-44
(Supp. 2003), and improper usage of lanes, a class C misdemeanor, in
violation of Utah Code Annotated section 41-6-61 (1998). At a bench
trial, Petitioner appeared pro se. After pleading guilty to DUI, the
charge of improper usage of lanes was dismissed. On June 4, 2002,
Petitioner was sentenced to a jail term of 180 days, ordered to pay a
fine, and placed on probation for eighteen months. Petitioner did not
file an appeal of his conviction to the district court within the
thirty days required by law. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-5-120(1) (2002).
However, on August 1, 2002, Petitioner filed, in the Third District
Court, a Petition for Post-Conviction Relief or, in the alternative,
Motion to Correct Illegally Imposed Sentence under Rules 65B and 65C
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. This petition sought an
extraordinary writ granting his immediate release on the grounds that
Petitioner was not represented by counsel, had not waived his right
to counsel, and was sentenced in violation of the Sixth Amendment.
14 The Justice Court held a review hearing on September 10, 2002,

where It suspended Petitioner 1 s remainii lg jail sentence and released
him from custody. Six days later, in the Third District Court, a
hearing took place on Petitioner's petition for post-conviction
relief. At this hearing, rather than challenging his plea or
conviction, Peti ti oner requested that his suspended sentence be
vacated.
15 After testimony from. Petitioner, proffered testimony of the
Justice Court judge, and submission of affidavit testimony of two
Justice Court clerks, the district court entered Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law stating that Petitioner knowingly and voluntarily
waived his right to be represented by counsel when he entered his
plea. Petitioner filed a timely appeal to this court for review of
the d is t ri c t co I i rt f s o rde r,

ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
16 Petitioner challenges the district cour t:' s dismissal of 1 I:i s
petition for post-conviction relief, claiming the record was
insufficient. The Justice Court: asserts the district court lacked
jurisdiction to consider the petition. In addition, the Justice Court
argues the district court properly found no violation of Petitioner's
Sixth. Amendment rights. "We review an appeal from an order dismissing
or denying a petition for post-conviction relief for correctness
without deference to the lower court's conclusions of 1 aw." Rudolph
v. Galetka, 2002 1 JT 7 1 1 13 P.3d 467.

ANALYSIS

I. Appellate Review of Justice Courts
17 We first discuss the Justice Court's argument that the district
court lacked jurisdiction to hear the petition because Petitioner did
not first appeal to the district court for a trial de novo. Rule 65C
(g)(1) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure directs the district
court, upon receiving a petition for post-conviction relief, to first
review the petition to ensure that the claims have not been
previously adjudicated, or that the claims are not frivolous. If the
court finds that the petition is not properly raised, the court is
required to summarily dismiss the claims. S ee Utah R. Civ. P. 65C(g)
(1). Additionally, Utah Code Annotated section 78-35a-106(1) (c)
(2002) precludes post-conviction relief when a claim "could have been
but was not raised at trial or on appeal." Id. In Hut_chings v. State,
2003 UT 52,514, 84 P.3d 1150, the Utah Supreme Court noted that rule
65C complements section 78-35a-106 and :i s "designed to balance the
'requirements of fairness and due process against the public's
interest i n the efficient adji idi cati on
of post-convIcti on

relief cases.1 '"" Id . (quoting uuau _. ......
•.. , ^, , .. . . t h e r e f o r e , c
d i s t r i c t court h a s j u r i s d i c t i o n over a p e t i t i o n for post-convictioi 1
r e l i e f in o r d e r to d e t e r m i n e its p r o c e d u r a l c o r r e c t n e s s .
18 11 i 11 11s case, it is ui ic 1 ear froin 11: Ie record whether the
district court conducted this preliminary review required by rule
65C. It is clear, however, that the district court did not summarily
dismiss the petition under rule 65C, but held a hearing on the
merits, received evidence, and entered its Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law dismissing the petition.^— As a result, the
district court correctly assumed jurisdiction over Petitioner's
petition. The remaining question is whether the district court should
have summarily dismissed the petition for failure to comply wi th rule
6 5 C and section 7 8-3 5a- ] 0 6.
19 The Justice Court argues that Petitioner was required to pursue
a direct appea 1 before seeking post-conviction relief. [ ::: '- The Utah
Constitution provides: "In criminal prosecutions the accused shall
have . . . the right to appeal in all cases." Utah Const, art. I, §
12. For criminal cases originating in justice courts, a defendant is
provided an appeal through "a trial de novo in the district court."
Utah Code Ann. § 78-5-120(1 ) (2002). Ii a trial de novo, the district
court Is "not acting in a typical appellate capacity." State v.
Hinson, 966 P.2d 273, 276 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). Because justice
courts are not courts of record, "the fappeal1 does not involve a
review of the justice court proceedings." Id. at 275. Through a trial
d e novo i i I t he dIs t r ic t c o ur t, "the parties essentially get a f res h
start," and the case is tried again as if it originated there. Dean
v. Henriod, 1999 UT App 50,519, 975 P. 2d 946 (quotations and citation
omitted). The district court's judgment after trial de novo is final
and may not be appealed either to this court or the Utah Supreme
Court absent an issue regarding the constitutionality of a statute or
ordinance. /See Utah Code Ann. § 78-5-120(7); Hinson, 966 P.2d at 276.
"[I]n Utah, . . . it is settled that the right to an 'appeal' from a
court not of record is satisfied by provision for a trial de novo in
a court of record." City of Monticello v. Christensen, 78 8 P.2d 513,
51 6 (Utah 19 90) .
110 In this case, after being sentenced, Petitioner chose not to
appeal his plea or conviction to the district court for a trial de
novo. It is clear, however, that a trial de novo would have remedied
any constitutional defects suffered by Petitioner in the Justice
Court. Instead, nearly two months after sentencing in the Justice
Court, Petitioner filed his Petition for Post-Conviction Relief with
the district court.
11] "A petitior I for post-conviction relief is a collateral attack
on a conviction and sentence and is i lot a substitute for direct
appellate review." Rudolph v. Galetka, 2002 UT 7,15, 43 P.3d 467. The

Post-Convictioi i Remedies Act, Utah Code Annotated sectIons ?8-35a-101
to -110 (2002), precludes post-conviction relief when a claim "could
have been but was not raised at trial or or i appeal." Utah Code Ann. §
78-35a-106(1)(c). The Utah Supreme Court has reiterated this
prohibition, but with one exception. "[IJssues that were not
addressed on direct appeal but could have been raised may not be
raised for the first time in a post-conviction relief proceeding
absent unusual circumstances." Rudolph, 2002 UT 7, at 15 (emphasis
added). The supreme court further defined unusual circumstances as
those that "show that there was an obvious injustice or a substantial
and prejudicial denial of a constitutional right." Carter v. Galetka,
2001 UT 96,115, 44 P.3d 626 (quotations and citation omitted); see
also Webster v. Jones, 587 P.2d 528, 530 (Utah 1978) (stating that
exigent circumstances exist where there "has been such unfairne?c or
failure to accord due process of law that it would be wholly
unconscionable not to re-examine the conviction" (footnote omitted))
"112 P e t i t i o i i e r a r g u e s 11 I a t 1 I i s i i I a b i ] i t y t o 1 i a v e 11 I e J u s t i c e
C o u r t ' s d e n i a l of c o u n s e l r e v i e w e d b y t h e d i s t r i c t court o n a di rect
appeal is unique and presents "unusual circumstances" with ai I
"obvious injustice or a substantial and prejudicial denial of a
constitutional right" warranting review. Carter, 2001 UT 96 at 515
(quotation and citations omitted). However, we are not persuaded that
Petitioner, in fact, suffered from, an obvious injustice. To the
contrary, the structure of Utah's justice court system, ensures that
when a defendant believes he or she has been deprived of a.
constitutional right by a justice court, that individual is ei it.itled
to a new trial in the district court. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-5-120
(1) (2002); Henriod, 1999 UT App 50 at 13. Voluntarily eschewing the
opportunity to remedy a constitutional violation through a trial de
novo does not create unusual circumstances permitting a petition for
post-conviction relief. By rejecting a trial de novo, Petitioner
acceded to any undesired result of the Justice Court's sentence.---Therefore, we hold that Petitioner did not suffer a "substantial and
prejudicial denial of a constitutional right," Carter, 2001 UT 96 at
515 (quotations and citations omitted), because he had the
opportunity to remedy his alleged denial of counsel, and chose not t :>
pursue that opportunity.-^- Because we conclude that the unusual,
circumstances exception does not apply in. this case, Petitioner was
precluded under Utah Code Annotated section 78-35a-106 from obtaining
relief through a petition for post-conviction relief. Given our
holding that the district court should have dismissed Petitioner's
petition for post-conviction relief and our disposition of this case
on that ground, we do not address the correctness of the trial
court's findings and conclusions.

CONCLUSION

"113 Petitioi ier failed to f i 1 e a time 1 y appea 1 to the di strict
court for a trial de novo. A trial de novo would, have remedied any
constitutional violations Petitioner may have suffered in the Justice
Court. After obtaining counsel, or properly waiving his right to
counsel, Petitioner could have either pleaded guilty again, or
challenged the charges in a trial. Defendant has not demonstrated
unusual circumstances consisting of "ai I obvious injustice or
substantial prejudicial denial of a constitutional right." Carter,
2001 UT 96 at 515. Thus, he has not established an exception to the
rule prohibiting post-conviction relief when the petitioner has not
first sought relief by direct appeal. We
accordingly affirm the result of the district court, but for the
reasons explained above.

Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge

114 I CONCUR II I TI IE RESULT:

Gregory K. Orrne, Judge

JACKSON, Judge (dissenting):
fl! 5 I respectf \ ] ] ] ] / dissent from the majority' s opinion.
I. The District Court's Jurisdiction to
H e a r a Pe t i t i o i I f o r Ex t ra o rd i na r y Re 2 i e f
SI16 It is unquestionably true that a defendant's right to appeal a
justice court conviction to a district court for a trial de novo
satisfies the various state and federal constitutional guarantees
relating to due process and the right to appeal. See, e.g., North v.
Russell, 427 U.S. 328, 337, 96 S. Ct. 2709, 2713 "(1976); City of
Monticello v. Christensen, 788 P.2d 513, 516 (Utah 1990). The
question before us, however, is not one of constitutional propriety,
but is instead a question of statutory interpretation. Specifically,
the question of whether the district court had jurisdiction to hear
Lucero's petition for post-conviction relief hinges upon our
reconciliation of two different statutory provisions. The first is

Utah Code An n o t a ted sec 11 o n 7 8-5 -12 0' (S u pp. 2 0 0 2 ) , w 1: I I c h d i c t a t e s t h e
m a n n e r by which defendants can appeal justice court convictions. T h a t
section is entitled "Appeals from justice c o u r t , " and provides that,
,f
[i]n a criminal case, a defendant is entitled to a trial de novo in
the district c o u r t . " IcL_ § 7 8 - 5 - 1 2 0 ( 1 ) . The second is Utah Code
A n n o t a t e d section 78-35a-106 (1996), which establishes the means by
which a defendant can petition for post-conviction relief under the
Post-Conviction Remedies A c t , See generally Utah Code A n n . §§ 7 8 - 3 5 a 106 to -110 (1996). Section 78-35a-106 (1) states that "[a] person is
not eligible for relief under this chapter upon any ground that: (a)
m a y still be raised on. direct appeal or by a post-trial
motion ," (Emphasis added.) The question before u s , then, is whether a
trial de novo qualifies as a "direct a p p e a l . " Id. The majority
concludes that it does, and therefore rules that Lucero's failure to
file for a trial de novo precludes him from petitioning for p o s t conviction relief under the Post-Conviction Remedies A c t . I d i s a g r e e .
11 /'" I fir st examii le tl le i neai lii lg of the p h r a s e "direct a p p e a l . "
T h e r e is no p r o v i s i o n in the P o s t - C o n v i c t i o n R e m e d i e s A c t that:
s p e c i f i c a l l y d e f i n e s w h a t c o n s t i t u t e s a "d:i recti: a p p e a l " for p u r p o s e s
of section 78-35a-106, nor is there a provision anywhere in the Utah
Code defining that specific phrase for purposes of any other
particular statutory scheme.-L-^- Accordingly, we must interpret tlle
m e a n i n g of this phrase using the accepted rules of statutory
interpretatioi I, '""When interpreting statutes, we determine the
statute's meaning by first looking to the statute's plain language,
and give effect to the plain language unless the language is
a m b i g u o u s . " Dick Simon Trucking, Inc. v. Utah State Tax C o m m ' n , 2004
UT 11,117, 84 P. 3d 1197. As I see it, a party receives a "direct
appeal 1 1 when an appellate tribunal conducts a case-specific, r u l i n g specific review of the lower court p r o c e e d i n g s . This understanding
comports with the limited discussion that this phrase has received :i i I
various Utah c o u r t s . See, e.g., Collins v. Sandy City Bd. of
A d j u s t m e n t , 2002 UT 7 7 , M 1 8 - 1 9 , 52 P. 3d 1267 (referring to a "direct
a p p e a l " as a "direct r e v i e w " ) ; see also State v. Hamilton, 2003 UT
22,125, 70 P.3d 111 (distinguishing "direct a p p e a l s " from collateral
a t t a c k s ) . Accordingly, Utah courts have used the phrase "direct
a p p e a l " to refer to a variety of situations in which appellate
tribunals undertook a case-specific, ruling-specific review of the
proceedings below. See, e.g., Hutchinqs v. State, 2003 UT 52,116, 84
P.3d 1150 (referring to an appellate review of a probation revocation
as a "direct a p p e a l " ) ; Thomas v. State, 2002 UT 128,16, 63 P.3d 672
(stating that such issues as the validity of a search w a r r a n t , the
admissibility of a confession, and the correctness of a bindover
order are reviewable on "direct a p p e a l " ) ; Salazar v. Utah State
Prison, 852 P.2d 988, 991 n.6 (Utah 1993) (referring to an appellate
review of a denial of a motion to wit! idraw a guilty plea as a "direct
a p p e a l " ) . Applied to the present case, a trial de novo would
therefore only constitute a "direct a p p e a l " of the justice cour t
conviction if it provided the di stri ct coi irt wi th the opport\ ini t; / to

conduct a case - s p e c i f i c , r 1 :i ] :i i 1 g - s p e c i f :i • :: r = ; :i e ; ; : f 11: 1 e j u s t :i :: € • ::: :
proceedings.
fl,8 I now turn to the scope of review provided by a "trial de
novo." In Pledger v. Cox, the Utah Supreme Court noted that "[t]he
words 'de novo' . . . have at ] east two possible interpretations when
applied to judicial review . , . i • (1) A complete retrial upon, new
evidence; and (2) a trial upon the record made before the lower
tribunal.1" 626 P.2d 415, 416 (Utah 1981) (quoting Denver & R.G.W.R.
Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 98 Utah 431, 436, 100 P.2d 552 (1940)).
Though "[t]he meaning of 'trial de novo' in each statute is obviously
dictated by the wording and context of the statute in which it
appears," id. , a trial de novo that is conducted following a
defendant's justice court conviction follows the first definition-that of a "complete retrial upon new evidence." Id. This comports
with the definition offered by Black's Law Dictionary, wherein "'tria1
de novo" :i s defined as "[a] new trial on the entire case—that is, on
both questions of fact and issues of law." Black's Law Dictionary
1512 (7th ed. deluxe 1999). Thus, "[b]ecause a justice of the peace
court in this state is not a court of record, an appeal from that
court is by way of a tri a] de novo in the district court, rather than
a review of the justice's rulings." Wisden v. District Ct., 6 94 P.2d
60 5, 60 6 (I Jtah 1 98 4) .
519 Because it acts "as if there had been i 10 trial :i n the first
instance," Black's Law Dictionary 1512 (7th ed. deluxe 1999), a
district court conducting a trial de novo "is not confined to the
record before the justice court and need not defer to the justice
court's findings and determinations. The district court neither
reverses nor affirms the judgment of the justice court, but renders a
new, distinct, and independent judgment." State v. Hinson, 966 P.2d
273, 276 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). When a district court conducts a trial
de novo review of a justice court conviction, "the case [stands]
precisely as it would have at that stage of the proceedings if it had
begun in that coin t in the first instance." Id_-_; accord Dean v.
Henriod, 1999 UT App 50, i9 n.l, 975 P.2d 946.-^--

120 When confronted with possible statutory conflicts that might
preclude a defendant from seeking post-conviction relief, "any
ambiguity that may exist . . . should be resolved in favor of a
criminal defendant." Smith v. Cook, 803 P.2d 788, 791 (Utah 1990).
Against this backdrop, I think that the majority's decision to deny
Lucero post-conviction relief based on his failure to request a trial
de novo is simply incorrect. Had Lucero requested a trial de novo,
the district court would have been required to act as if "the
proceedings had begun i n tha.t court in the first instance." Hinson,
966 P.2d at 27 6. As such, Lucero would not have had the opportunity

to i^•.. ... l l ± >, ..pp^d,
.J. i,<.,.:11cu 1 ar legal conclusions or f ac11 ia]
findinqs of the justice court that he believed were e r r o n e o u s .
L u c e r o ' o trial :ie novo would not have been a framed, p a r t i c u l a r i z e d
p r o c e e d i n g that w a s d i r e c t e d at the review of specific alleged
e r r o r s ; instead, the district court conducting the trial de novo
w o u l d have acted as a broad, general tribunal that would have
e x a m i n e d t h e charges anew. Insofar as this avenue of appeal would
simply not have given Lucero the opportunity to directly challenge
any alleged errors b e l o w , I think, it clear that the trial de novo
cannot b e regarded as a "direct appeal."l^121 A s I see :i t, t h e plain language of the statutory scheme thus
p r o v i d e s a defendant w h o has been convicted in a justice court
p r o c e e d i n g w i t h two separate avenues of relief. First, the d e f e n d a n t
can e x e r c i s e h i s statutory right to file for a trial de novo. T h e
a d v a n t a g e s of this course would be clear: though the defendant w o u l d
not have the o p p o r t u n i t y to have the trial court review any p o t e n t i a l
e r r o r s that occurred below, the defendant would have the o p p o r t u n i t y
u n d e r this fresh start to try and persuade a n e w finder of fact: of
his or h e r i n n o c e n c e . Should the defendant choose not to file for a
trial de n o v o , h o w e v e r , the defendant is still allowed to p e t i t i o n a
d i s t r i c t court for p o s t - c o n v i c t i o n relief under the P o s t - C o n v i c t i o n
R e m e d i e s A c t . In this hearing, the trial court would have the
a u t h o r i t y to d i r e c t l y review the proceedings in the justice court t o
d e t e r m i n e w h e t h e r any constitutional error occurred. ^ ' In this c a s e ,
L u c e r o p r o p e r l y and validly chose the second option, and t h e trial
court correctly determined that 11 did have jurisdiction to hear t h e
m e r i t s of L u c e r o f s p e t i t i o n for p o s t - c o n v i c t i o n relief. I would
a c c o r d i n g l y conclude that t h e ma j o r i t y's r e ve r sa 1 o f t h at t h re sh c • 1 d
d e t e r m i n a t i o n is in e r r o r .

11
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122 Because of my conclusion that Lucero did have a right to
petition for post-conviction relief, I think that we are obligated to
review the district court's determination that Lucero's waiver of the
right to counsel at the justice court proceeding was constitutiona] ly
valid. Having reviewed the record and the applicable law, I would
conclude that Lucero did not validly waive his right to counsel and
that the district court's denial of Lucero's petition for postconviction re1ief shou 1 d according1y be reversed.
123 "The right to have the assistance of counsel in a criminal
trial is a fundamental constitutional right which must be jealously
protected by the trial court." State v. Heaton, 958 P.2d 911, 917
(Utah 1998). "Because of the importance of the right to counsel and
the heavy burden placed upon the trial court to protect this right,
there is a presumption against waiver, and doubts concerning waiver

must be reso 1 ved 1.1 i 11: ie def endant' s f avor. ''" Id However, because the
right to assistance of counsel is "personal in nature," State v,
Frampton, 737 P.2d 183, 187 (Utah 1987), the right "may be waived by
a competent accused If the waiver is "knowingly and intelligently'
made." Id. (citation omitted); see also State v. Bakalov, 84 9 P.2d
629, 633 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). Further, the relevant Utah cases
establish that there is a distinction between the "knowingly" and the
"intelligently" prongs of the waiver test.
"Intelligei Itf'" 11 i 11 Iis coi Itext meai Is ffon 1 ^ 11: Ia t 11 ie defendant has been
provided with adequate information on which to make his or her selfrepresentation choice. Because such a choice is seldom, if ever, a
wise one, 'intelligent 1 does not carry that meaning here." "Knowing"
refers to a defendant's competence to waive the right to coi inse],
si mi ]ar to a defendant's competence to stand trial . . . .
State v. McDonald, 922 P.2d 776, 779
omitted).

(Utah Ct. App. 1996)

(citations

524 Before determining that a defendant has knowingly and
intelligently waived his or her right to counsel, a trial court has
an affirmative duty to "conduct a thorough inquiry of the defendant"
in order to ensure "that the defendant's waiver of counsel is
knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made." Heaton, 958 P.2d at
918. Though a colloquy on the record is ::...• required, see State v.
Valencia, 2001 UT App 159,5520-22, 27 P.3d 573, it is "the preferred
method of ascertaining the validity of a waiver because it insures
that defendants understand the risks of self-representation,"
Frampton, 737 P.2d at 187. "Where there is no colloquy, j.appellate
courts] 'will look at any evidence in the record 1 " created in t.he
district court in order to ascertain whether the district cour: u",s
fulfilled its duty of inquiry. Valencia, " ; V M T " ^nn i rcJ ^r- HT//
(quotd ng Frampton, 737 P 2d at ] 8 8 ) . ( 5 )

SI25 Ii I explaii ling tl le contours of t\ lis required inquiry, the
United States Supreme Court has stated that the defendant "should be
made aware of the dangers ar id disadvantages of self-representation"
prior to the trial court's acceptance of a waiver of the right to
counsel. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835, 95 S. Ct. 2525,
2541 (1974). In accordance with the United States Supreme Court's
unquestioned authority over questions of federal constitutional law,
Utah courts have long enforced the Faretta directive as part of the
Sixth Amendment analysis. See Heaton, 958 P.2d at 918; Frampton, 737
P.2d at 188; State v. Ruple, 631 P.2d 874, 875-76 (Utah 1981); State
v. Dominquez, 564 P.2d 768, 769-70 (Utah 1977); State v. Petty, 2001
UT App 396, SI8,
38 P»3d 998; Valencia, 2001 UT App 159 at 122; McDonald, 922 P.2d at

7

Baj^c^iuv,

SI2 6 The proper scope of the Faretta directive was recently
addressed by the United Jtates Supreme Court in Iowa v. Tovar, 541
!
U..
•••; :•:-.
1379, 2004 U.S. Lexis 1837, * (2004). ^ ] In Tovar,
the aerendant was arrested for operating a motor vehicle while under
the influence of alcohol. See id. at *10. An intoxilyzer test
administered the night of the defendant's arrest showed that he had a
blood alcohol level true w^s well above the legal limit. See id. At
his arraignment, the defendant informed the court that he wished to
waive his right to counsel and that he wished to plead guilty. See
id. at *12. The court accordingly conducted a plea colloquy in wh•ch
the court explained that the defendant had the right to be
represented at trial by an attorney who "could help [the defendant]
select a jury, question and cross-examine the State's witnesses,
present evidence, if any, in [his] behalf, and make arguments to the
judge and jury on [his] behalf." I d at *12-13 (second and third
alterations in original). After receiving this and other warnings,
the defendant affirmed his wish to waive h:i s ri ght to ::ounse 1 and to
plead guilty. See id. at *] 4.

127 Several years later, the defendant was arrested for a third
DUI offense, and accordingly sought to challenge his prior guilty
plea as a means of avoiding a recidivist sentence enhancement. See
id. at *16-17. After proceeding through the lower Iowa courts, the
Iowa Supreme Court ruled that the original waiver was
constitutionally invalid due to the fact that the defendant had not
been informed of "the dangers of self-representation " Id. at *19
(quotations and citation omitted).
528 On appeal, however, the United States Supreme Court reversed.
See id. at *33. In reversing, the Court held that "[t]he information
a defendant must possess in order to make an intelligent election
.
. will depend on a range of case-specific factors, including the
defendant's education or sophistication, the complex or easily
grasped nature of the charge, and the stage of the proceeding." IdL
at *23 (emphasis added). While the Faretta directive is still
required before a court accepts a waiver of counsel before trial, see
id. at *23-24, "at the earlier stages of the criminal process, a less
searching or formal colloquy may suffice." Id. at *24. Quoting prior
precedent, the Court explained that "[w]e require less rigorous
warnings pretrial . . . not because pretrial proceedings are 'less
important' than trial, but because, at that stage, 'the full dangers
and disadvantages of self-representation
, are less substantial
and more obvious to an accused than they are at trial fIf Id. at *26
(quotations and citations omitted).
129 Endorsing a "pragmatic approach to the waiver question," id.
at *25 (quotations and citations omitted), the Court ultimately

concluded that the inquiry must rest on "the particular facts and
circumstances" of each case. See id. at *3. Analyzing the Tovar
litigation, the Court concluded that there was not a "realistic"
"prospect" that a "meritorious defense" would have existed for Tovar
at trial or that the defendant could have pled "to a lesser charge."
Id. at *32. Because "the admonitions at issue might confuse or
mislead a defendant [in such a scenario] more than they would inform
him," id., the Court ultimately concluded that the lower court did
not err by failing to inform Tovar of the dangers and disadvantages
of self-representation.
130 Counsel for the Murray City Justice Court argues that Tovar
mandates affirmance in the present case. I disagree with that
proposition. While it may be true that Tovar will require a
reexamination of our "dangers and disadvantages" jurisprudence, at
least as applied to waivers at a plea hearing, the facts of the
present case do not require such a reexamination here. As discussed
above, the Tovar ruling was expressly predicated on the unquestioned
evidence that Tovar would have had no "realistic" alternatives to
pleading guilty. Id. at *32. Further, the trial court in Tovar did
conduct an on-record colloquy in which the court advised Tovar of
some of the advantages that having an attorney would have offered.
See id. at *13. In the present case, however, there is a complete
absence of evidence from which we could similarly conclude that
Lucero lacked a realistic prospect of success
at trial or in
negotiations with prosecutors. There is likewise no evidence that
Lucero was informed by the justice court of any of the advantages of
having counsel present at the hearing. Our supreme court has
previously held that "there is a presumption against waiver." Heaton,
958 P.2d at 917. Given this presumption, I think that we are
obligated to conclude that Lucero was not informed of how the right
to counsel would have applied "in general in the circumstances,"
Tovar, 2004 U.S. Lexis 1837 at *29 (emphasis omitted), and that
Lucero1s waiver of the right to counsel was thus invalid. As such, I
would reverse the district court's dismissal of Lucero!s petition for
post-conviction relief.

Norman H. Jackson, Judge
1. Under Utah Code Annotated section 78-5-101 (2002), justice courts
are courts "not of record."
2. The Justice Court likewise argues that this court does not have
jurisdiction over this case. However, the court of appeals has
jurisdiction to review a district court's denial of a petition for
post-conviction relief pursuant to Utah Code Annotated section 78-2a3(2)(f) (2002). See also Utah R. Civ. P. 65C(o).

3. Petitioner argues that because the Justice Court did not raise
this issue before the district court, it is now barred because it
would constitute an alternative ground for affirmance not apparent on
the record nor sustainable by the factual findings. See State v.
Topanotes, 2003 UT 30,19, 76 P.3d 1159. However, " [jJurisdictional
issues may be raised for the first time on appeal." M.M.J, v. R.N.J.,
908 P.2d 345, 347 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). Moreover, Petitioner's
argument is moot because we have determined the district court had
jurisdiction.
4. Through his post-conviction relief petition, Petitioner does not
challenge the Justice Court plea or conviction. Instead, for reasons
not apparent to this court, he seeks only a dismissal of the
remaining suspended sentence.
5. The Justice Court also argues that Petitioner should be precluded
from bringing a petition for post-conviction relief because he did
not explain why he failed to take a direct appeal. In support of this
argument, it cites Summers v. Cook, 759 P.2d 341, 343 (Utah Ct. App.
1988), and Wells v. Shulsen, 747 P.2d 1043, 1044 (Utah 1987), where
the courts held that in addition to showing an obvious injustice, the
defendants were required to explain why they did not take a direct
appeal. However, Summers and Wells were both decided prior to the
enactment of the Post-Conviction Remedies Act, Utah Code Annotated
sections 78-35a-101 to -110 (2002), which does not require such an
initial showing of why a direct appeal was not taken. We note that
even though a defendant is not required to explain why he did not
bring a direct appeal, such an explanation may be helpful in showing
extraordinary circumstances.
1. Black's Law Dictionary defines a "direct appeal" as "[a]n appeal
from a trial court's decision directly to the jurisdiction's highest
court, thus bypassing review by an intermediate appellate court."
Black's Law Dictionary 94 (7th ed. deluxe 1999). A review of the Utah
cases, however, indicates that this strict definition is not followed
by our courts. In Pascual v. Carver, for example, the Utah Supreme
Court referred to the defendant's prior appeal, which had been heard
in the Utah Court of Appeals, as a "direct appeal" of the conviction.
876 P.2d 364, 366 (Utah 1994). Similarly, in State v. Lara, we
referred to an appeal of a bindover order that was heard in this
court as a "direct appeal." 2003 UT App 318,520, 79 P.3d 951.
2. Given this construct, Utah courts have insisted that though a
district court exercises its "appellate jurisdiction" when conducting
a trial de novo, State v. Hudecek, 965 P.2d 1069, 1071 (Utah Ct. App.
1998), the trials de novo that are held before the district courts
must not be characterized in the same manner as a standard appeal
which is held before the court of appeals or supreme court. In State
v. Hinson, this court clearly drew this distinction, therein
declaring that certain rules governing a case filed "[i]n a

conventional appeal environment . . . [have] no place in an appeal
from a justice court judgment." 966 P.2d 273, 275-76 (Utah Ct. App.
1998). Similarly, we emphasized in Dean v. Henriod that there is a
distinction between a "traditional appeal" and "an appeal from
justice court." 1999 UT App 50,119 n.l, 975 P.2d 946. Thus, when a
district court conducts a trial de novo, the district court is "not
acting in a typical appellate capacity." Hinson, 966 P.2d at 276. In
a related context, the Utah Supreme Court has declared that, because
a district court has the authority to make findings of fact in its
trial de novo review of Industrial Commission decisions, the district
court should be viewed "as an independent fact finder and not as an
intermediate appellate court." University of Utah v. Industrial
Comm'n, 736 P.2d 630, 633 (Utah 1987) (emphasis omitted).
3. There is some confusion as to whether Murray City Justice Court's
argument is predicated on Utah Code Annotated section 78-35a-106(1)
(a) (1996) (precluding relief under the Post-Conviction Remedies Act
where the petition is based on a ground that "may still be raised on
direct appeal") or whether it is instead predicated on Utah Code
Annotated section 78-35a-106(1)(c) (1996) (precluding relief under
the Post-Conviction Remedies Act where the petition is based on a
ground that "could have been but was not raised at trial or on
appeal"). Though Murray City Justice Court's brief did not specify
which of these subsections its argument was predicated on, the brief
did directly discuss Utah Code Annotated section 78-35a-102 (1)
(1996), which states that relief is appropriate where a defendant has
"exhausted all other legal remedies, including a direct
appeal." (Emphasis added.) Given this reference, and given the
repeated references throughout the remainder of the brief to Lucero's
failure to exercise his rights to a "direct appeal," I think it clear
that any specific argument arising under Utah Code Annotated section
78-35a-106 (1) (c) is not properly before us.
Even were we to consider the subtle differences embodied by
section 78-35a-106(1)(c), however, I think that the result here would
be the same. As discussed above, though the trial de novo is
considered to be the form by which a defendant can "appeal" his or
her justice court conviction, it is still nevertheless true that the
district court conducting the trial de novo cannot consider any
particular claims of error that might have arisen below. Thus,
insofar as the defendant in such circumstances cannot "raise" any
issues in his "appeal," I think that the result under either section
78-35a-106(1)(a) or section 78-35a-106(1)(c) would be the same.
4. At oral argument, Murray City Justice Court argued that allowing
defendants who are convicted in justice court to have two separate
avenues of appellate relief is unnecessary and duplicative. This
concern, however, is misplaced. Instead, I think that there is a
certain degree of logic present in allowing a defendant to bypass the
trial de novo stage and instead directly appeal for post-conviction
relief. The financial costs and emotional tolls that are involved in

having to prepare for and go through a trial de novo can be heavy. In
situations where a defendant has suffered a clear constitutional
wrong at the justice court level, it would seem patently unjust to
require the defendant to pay for and endure a full trial before
allowing the defendant any access to direct appellate review.
Instead, I think that our statutory scheme is wise in allowing
defendants in such situations to immediately petition a court for
redress under the Post-Conviction Remedies Act, while at the same
time allowing defendants who are willing to proceed to trial the
opportunity to pursue that course of action instead. Regardless, I
again note that this appears to be the statutorily created system.
Thus, I see no option but to conclude that, as presently constituted,
the Utah Code does allow a defendant to choose between these two
different forms of relief.
5. In its brief and again at oral argument, counsel for Lucero
asserted that, insofar as justice court proceedings are not conducted
on the record, our review of this case should be limited to the
information contained in the justice court docket or filings. The
cases state, however, that an appellate court reviewing a waiver of
that right must be able to look at "f any evidence in the record1" in
order to determine whether the right was properly waived. State v.
Valencia, 2001 UT App 159,122, 27 P.3d 273 (emphasis added) (quoting
State v. Frampton, 737 P.2d 183, 188 (Utah 1987)); accord State v.
Heaton, 958 P.2d 911, 919 (Utah 1998); State v. McDonald, 922 P.2d
776, 780 (Utah Ct. App. 1996).
Similarly, I also note my disagreement with Lucero?s assertion
that the trial court in this case should not have received testimony
from witnesses in its efforts to ascertain whether the waiver
proceedings at the justice court were constitutionally valid. In
State v. Gutierrez, the defendant sought to challenge the application
of a repeat offender DUI enhancement statute to his case, therein
arguing that his prior convictions were each invalid. See 2003 UT App
95,552-5, 68 P. 3d 1035. As part of his challenge, the defendant
argued that one of his prior guilty pleas, entered at a justice
court, had been involuntary. See id. at 59. In upholding the use of
the justice court guilty plea by the trial court, we concluded that
Gutierrez had failed to prove involuntariness. See id. at 512.
Addressing Gutierrez's concerns about how he could have established
such proof where the justice court keeps no official record, we noted
that "Gutierrez could have produced testimony from those who were
present regarding the taking of his plea, the court's docket sheet,
or other affirmative evidence." Id. In spite of this clear holding,
Lucero suggests that there is a distinction between the trial court's
use of such testimony for purposes of sentence enhancement and for
use when the trial court reviews a petition for post-conviction
relief. I disagree with that attempted distinction. In both
situations, the trial court is simply exercising its authority to
review the lower proceedings in order to determine whether they were
constitutionally valid. Given the important nature of this solemn

responsibility, I see no reason why the trial court should be limited
in its ability to inquire as to what occurred in the justice court
proceedings. Accordingly, I would conclude that the trial court's use
of testimony and extrinsic evidence in this case was proper.
6. Counsel for Murray City Justice Court points us to language in
McDonald, wherein we stated that "a recommendation by the court
against self-representation is not necessary for a defendant to
intelligently waive the right to counsel." 922 P.2d at 785. Murray
City Justice Court argues that this language obviates the duty of
inquiry discussed above. I disagree. A careful reading of the
precedent discussed above indicates that the trial courtfs specific
duty here is to ensure that the defendant understands the "dangers
and disadvantages" of self-representation. Heaton, 958 P.2d at 918
(emphasis added); accord McDonald, 922 P.2d at 779. Though subtle,
there is a clear distinction between a rule requiring the court to
inform a defendant of the dangers and disadvantages of selfrepresentation and one requiring the court to take the further step
of actually advising the defendant not to represent himself or
herself. The former is simply a fulfillment of the court's duty to
ensure that the defendant has the proper information; the latter
would put the trial court into the role of advisor to the defendant,
a role that would clearly be impermissible. As discussed below, a
subsequent decision by the United States Supreme Court may indicate
that a warning of the dangers and disadvantages of selfrepresentation is not required at all stages of litigation. However,
I would stress here that our statement in McDonald regarding the lack
of a "recommendation" requirement does not remove the duty of inquiry
from trial courts before accepting a counsel waiver at the trial
setting.
6. Though Tovar was concededly decided after the events at issue here
took place, it is a "long standing traditional rule . . . that the
law established by a court decision applies both prospectively and
retrospectively, even when the decision overrules prior case law."
Carter v. Galetka, 2001 UT 96,1126, 44 P. 3d 626 (quotations and
citations omitted).
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Court of Appeals of Utah.
STATE of Utah, ih the interest of Z.D. and
A.D., persons under eighteen years of age.
S.B.D. and L.D., Appellants,
v.
State of Utah, Appellee.
No. 20030750-CA.
July 29, 2004.
Background: State filed petition alleging that
infant child was abused and neglected while in
father's care. The Third Juvenile Court, Salt Lake
Department, Olof A. Johansson, J., found that child
was abused and neglected. Mother and father
appealed.

211 —
211VIII Dependent, Neglected, and Delinquent
Children
211VIII(C) Evidence
211kl75 Weight and Sufficiency
211kl79 Deprivation, Neglect, or Abuse.
Clear and convincing evidence did not establish that
fracture sustained by infant child was caused by an
axial load sometime during day when child was in
father's care, and thus did not support trial court's
adjudication of child as abused and neglected;
pediatrician testified that he could only be "51/49"
percent certain that fracture was caused by a
significant axial force applied to bent knee, neither
one of State's own witnesses bolstered pediatrician's
opinion, and child had no bruising or swelling,
which would have likely been present if fracture had
been caused by axial load.
Sara Pfrommer, Park City, for Appellants.

Holding: The Court of Appeals, Bench, Associate
P.J., held that clear and convincing evidence did not
establish that fracture sustained by child was caused
by an axial load sometime during day when child
was in father's care, and thus did not support trial
court's adjudication of child as abused and
neglected.
Reversed.

Mark L. Shurtleff, Atty. Gen., and John M.
Peterson, Asst. Atty. Gen., Salt Lake City, for
Appellee.
Martha Pierce and Robert N. Parrish, Salt Lake
City, Guardians Ad Litem.
*41 Before BILLINGS, P.J., BENCH, Associate
P.J.,andTHORNE, J.

West Headnotes
OPINION
[1] Appeal and Error <®==> 1008.1(2)
BENCH, Associate Presiding Judge:
30 -—
30XVI Review
30XVI(I) Questions of Fact, Verdicts, and
Findings
30XVI(I)3 Findings of Court
30k 1008 Conclusiveness in General
30kl008.1 In General
30kl008.1(2) Same Effect as Verdict.
An appellate court does not give factual
determinations made by a trial judge the same
amount of deference given to factual determinations
made by a jury-that is, an appellate court does not,
as a matter of course, resolve all conflicts in the
evidence in favor of the appellee.
[2] Infants <®^ 179

If 1 S.B.D. and L.D. (Father and Mother)
challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting
the juvenile court's determination that Z.D., one of
their children, suffered a femur fracture while in
Father's care. After receiving evidence, (FN1) the
court determined that "sufficient and clear and
convincing evidence has been established ... to
conclude it was non-accidental trauma without a
reasonable and acceptable explanation from either
parent as to its causation." We reverse.

BACKGROUND
| 2 Father took care of his infant son, Z.D., and
two-year-old daughter, A.D., for most of the day on
Saturday, November 16, 2002, while Mother was

© 2005 Thomson/West. No claim to original U.S. Govt, works.

undermining effect on the stability of the Pearsons' marriage
within the meaning of Schoolcraft's public policy analysis.
While the reality of the Pearsons' ultimate divorce may minimize
the importance of the first Schoolcraft prong, we cannot say on
the facts of this case that it obviates that prong altogether.

B.

Protection of Children from Attacks on Paternity

The second, and in this case more problematic, policy
consideration under the Schoolcraft test is "protecting children
from disruptive and unnecessary attacks upon their paternity."
In re J.W.F., 799 P.2d 710, 713 (Utah 1990).

There are crucial

distinctions between the Pearsons' case and In re J.W.F. that
lead us to conclude that Thanos's challenge to Z.P.'s paternity
is both disruptive and unnecessary.

In In re J.W.F., J.W.F. was promptly abandoned by his mother
at birth, his natural father apparently never sought or enjoyed
any parental role whatsoever, and his mother's husband Winfield
never had custody of J.W.F. or a relationship with him.
at 712.

See id.

J.W.F. was a little over one year olrd at the time of the

5. We note that the pnjtblic policy in favor of preserving the
stability of marriageJmay be even stronger m light of Utah's
enshrmement of so-called traditional marriage into its
constitution in 2004. See Utah Const, art. I, sec. 29; but see
Citizens for Equal Prot. v. Brunmg, 368 F. Supp. 2d 980 (D. Neb.
2005) (declaring a similar state constitutional amendment invalid
on various grounds including free association and equal
protection).
20040677-CA
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away from the home. Early that morning, before
leaving, Mother gave Z.D. a dose of Tylenol for the
earache, constipation, and teething that Z.D. had
been experiencing in the days prior. He was not
given another dose of Tylenol until later that
evening. Z.D. took a nap in the afternoon. When
Z.D. awoke, he was fussy, and Father noticed that
he was favoring his left leg by holding his foot up so
that it did not touch Father's lap. Father laid Z.D.
in his lap and rubbed the leg because Father thought
the flu shot Z.D. had received on Friday, November
15, 2002, was bothering him. Z.D. did not like
having his leg rubbed and continued to be fussy.
Father wrapped him up tightly in what the parents
called a "burrito wrap" and held him. Z.D. stopped
being fussy and appeared comfortable. When
Mother returned home that evening, she also noticed
that Z.D. was favoring his left leg. Mother and
Father attributed Z.D.'s favoring of his left leg to
the flu shot, but called Kids Care just to be sure.
Kids Care reassured them that there was no need to
worry, and that Z.D. did not need to be examined.
That night Z.D. slept normally and did not display
fussiness indicative of pain.

immediately notified the Division of Child and
Family Services (DCFS). (FN2) The emergency
room staff also notified the Center for Safe and
Healthy Families, a group at Primary responsible
for identifying and investigating suspected cases of
child abuse. Dr. Bruce Herman, a pediatrician and
member of the Center for Safe and Healthy Families
team, took charge of the investigation and examined
Z.D. at Primary the following day, Monday,
November 18, 2002. After interviewing Father and
Mother, Herman concluded that Z.D. had become
acutely symptomatic on Saturday, November 16,
which would be consistent with *42 the fracture
occurring on that day. He also opined that the
mechanism causing the fracture would most likely
be excessive axial loading of the femur, and that the
parents offered no history providing such a
mechanism.
1f 5 Because Father was employed by DCFS as an
in-home child welfare worker, DCFS retained an
independent investigator, Paul Dean, to conduct an
investigation of the circumstances surrounding
Z.D.'s fracture. Dean first saw Z.D. at Primary.
Z.D. was wearing only a diaper, shirt, and fabric
splint on his left leg. No marks were visible on
Z.D.'s exposed body parts. When Dean interviewed
Father and Mother, neither of them could provide an
explanation consistent with the mechanism Dr.
Herman had described.

| 3 On Sunday morning, November 17, 2002,
when Z.D. continued to favor his left leg, Father
took him to Primary Children's Medical Center
(Primary) to be examined. The first doctor at
Primary to examine Z.D. moved his leg around
some, but could not find anything wrong. Another
doctor came and placed Z.D. on an examination
table. The second doctor pushed Z.D.'s legs up
against his torso, straightened and bent his legs, and
wiggled and moved them around. Z.D. cried fairly
intensely. After Z.D.'s leg was x-rayed, Father was
told that Z.D.'s left femur was fractured just above
the knee. Z.D. was described by hospital workers
as cheerful, interactive, alert, and slightly fussy, but
consolable. At some point, Z.D. was examined by
Dr. Bridgette Sipher. Sipher noted that Z.D. was in
no apparent distress except when his left leg was
manipulated. Additionally, there was no bruising
anywhere on Z.D.'s body, and no fever, redness, or
swelling.
Sipher recommended Tylenol or
ibuprofen for pain, with Lortab to be considered if
necessary. Although there was decreased movement
in Z.D.'s left leg, Z.D. was still moving it
independently.

If 6 On Tuesday, November 19, 2002, Mother,
Father, and Z.D.'s grandparents were at the hospital
when Herman stopped by the hospital room.
Mother's mother (Grandmother) asked Dr. Herman
whether the fracture could have occurred during an
incident with a baby walker on the previous
Wednesday, November 13, 2002, where Z.D.'s leg
became stuck in the walker and Grandmother
released his leg by pulling it through the hole of the
walker. Herman did not acknowledge the question
and, instead, continued to talk. Grandmother asked
the same question again. Herman continued to write
on his notepad and then left the room. The next
day, Grandmother again posed the walker question
to Herman, who then said that the walker incident
was not a possible cause of the fracture. He did not
follow up on Grandmother's question at that time.
(FN3)

| 4 In accordance with Primary's policy to notify
the State whenever a fracture is discovered in a
nonambulatory child? the emergency room staff

1 7 Later, on December 11, 2003, the family
requested a meeting with Herman and other
members of the Center for Safe and Healthy
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rule.5

She was startled both by the initial recognition of

Defendant and also by his threat to kill her.

When she made the

statements she was still under the stress of the excitement
caused by the event and, in fact, the encounter with Defendant
was ongoing at that time.

Allred's statements fall under the

excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule, are not
testimonial, and were properly admitted by the trial court.

Officer Don Ouimette's Testimony:

Defendant also challenges

Officer Ouimette's testimony, arguing that it contained the
defendant's inadmissible hearsay statement threatening to kill
Allred.

At trial, defense counsel offered the police report

about the incident into evidence.

Officer Ouimette then read the

entire report from the stand, including the following description
of events: "Dycie states that eventually Rocky got her pinned in
and got out of his car and began yelling, quote, 'I'm going to
. . . kill you.'"

Tr. of Jury Trial at 144.

"[0]n appeal, a party cannot take advantage of an error
committed at trial when that party led the trial court into
committing the error."
1993).

State v. Dunn,

850 P.2d 1201, 1220 (Utah

The "invited error" doctrine serves two purposes, first,

5.
The statements also fall within the "present sense
impression" exception to the hearsay rule. See Utah R. Evid.
803(1).
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Families in order to present the walker incident as a
possible mechanism for the fracture. Grandmother
gave a demonstration of how she had tried to place
Z.D. in his walker, but his left leg became stuck,
his knee bent with his foot behind him. In her
attempt to extricate his wedged leg, she placed her
left hand and thumbs on his left leg above his knee
and pushed, and then pulled his foot down through
the hole of the walker with her right hand. Z.D. let
out a shrill, vigorous cry, but calmed down within
fifteen seconds.
f 8 In a separate meeting, after Grandmother
demonstrated the walker incident, the Primary
doctors met and agreed that their opinions were
unchanged by the demonstration. Kari Cunningham,
Primary's liaison to DCFS and a child protective
services worker with DCFS, was present at the
meeting with the doctors. She observed that the
doctors agreed that someone could have caused the
fracture using their hand, but that the force involved
in the walker incident would not have been sufficient
to cause the fracture. Cunningham testified that, in
discussing the mechanism and forces involved, the
doctors did not discuss the medications Z.D. had
been taking, the fact that he was often placed in a
burrito wrap, and Z.D.'s activities in the days
between Wednesday and Saturday.
f 9 Dr. G. William Nixon, a pediatric radiologist
at Primary, did not participate in this meeting.
Nixon had earlier opined that the fracture was not
caused by direct axial loading, consistent with
Herman's opinion, but rather was caused by angular
leverage. Dr. John Smith, a pediatric orthopedist at
Primary, was also not present during the walker
demonstration on December 11, 2002, but was
consulted via telephone. Smith wrote a letter dated
December 11, 2002 in which he explained that the
fracture could result from the forceful wedging of
the leg over a fulcrum (as in the walker incident),
but that it would be "difficult to know the degree of
force that would be required to produce this fracture
by this mechanism."
f 10 At trial, Herman elucidated his position
regarding the possible mechanism of the fracture:
We [the doctors] all agreed that that [the walker
incident] would not be the typical mechanism or the
one we would usually *43 see to explain that
fracture and I certainly have not said that that
would have been impossible to be the mechanism.

Page 3
I have that--and it's still my opinion that it was
unlikely that that was the mechanism.
In clarifying his view, Herman said that while the
walker incident was ^possible mechanism for the
fracture, it was not the likely mechanism. As to
whether he significantly disagreed with Nixon as to
the mechanism of the fracture, he answered,
"Significant is a word-I mean we had disagreements
about the actual mechanism that could have caused
this but would I describe them as significant? No,
sir."
If 11 On cross-examination, Dean said it would
have been important for him to know whether there
was a disagreement among the doctors as to the
probable mechanism of the fracture; however, Dean
was not made aware of the differing opinions. Dean
also testified that he did not know, and did not
consider the fact, that Z.D. had been taking Tylenol
between the time of the walker incident and when he
entered the emergency room on Sunday morning.
Nor was Dean aware that Z.D. had been suffering
from constipation and an earache, had been teething
during that time period, and had received a flu shot
on Friday. Dean admitted that all of these factors
would have been important for him to know.
f 12 In his testimony, Herman identified three
factors to be considered in investigating Z.D.'s
fracture: 1) the type of fracture, which helps to
determine the mechanism and force; 2) the age of
the fracture; and 3) the symptoms associated with
the fracture. He explained that, taken together,
these factors demonstrated that Z.D.'s femur
fracture was the result of nonaccidental trauma
inflicted on Saturday, November 16, rather than the
walker incident on Wednesday, November 13.
If 13 As to mechanism, Herman testified that he
was "51/49" percent certain that the fracture was
caused by a significant axial force applied to a bent
knee. As to the force, Herman thought it unlikely
that the walker could generate the forces required to
fracture the femur. As to the age of the fracture,
both Wednesday (the date of the walker incident)
and Saturday (the date Herman noted Z.D.
manifested symptoms), fit within the time period
identified as when the fracture could have occurred.
As to the type and timing of symptoms, Herman
thought that if the walker incident had been the
cause of the fracture, then Mother and Father would
have noticed symptoms of a broken leg prior to
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It then concluded that the statements to the dispatcher relating
to the nature of the attack, the victim's medical needs, her age,
and location were nontestimonial.

Id. at 92.

In contrast,

information related to a description of her stolen vehicle, the
direction the assailants had fled, and the items of personal
property stolen were held to be testimonial and inadmissible
without prior opportunity for cross examination.

Id.

Since Crawford, a number of other courts have also
considered the circumstances under which statements made to a 911
dispatcher are testimonial.

Some courts hold that all statements

made during calls to a 911 emergency dispatcher are not
testimonial because they are akin to a "cry for help" rather than
an attempt to investigate or prosecute a crime against the
defendant.

See, e.g., People v. Corella, 18 Cal. Rptr. 3d 77 0,

776 (2004) (911 call not testimonial because statements not
knowingly given in response to structured police questioning);
People v. Caudillo, 19 Cal. Rptr. 3d 574, 590

(2004) (same);

People v. Moscat, 777 N.Y.S.2d 875, 879 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 2004)
(911 call not testimonial because it has its genesis in the
urgent desire to be rescued from immediate peril).

In contrast,

the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that all
statements made during a call to a 911 dispatcher are testimonial
because the dispatcher is a government official and the declarant
should reasonably expect the statements to be used in a future
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Saturday. Herman maintained that symptoms of a
broken leg would have been apparent, especially
when Z.D.'s leg was moved during daily activities
like diaper changes and clothing changes.
Regardless of
Z.D.'s
teething, earache,
constipation, taking of Tylenol, absence of external
injuries, and the fact that he was often tightly
swaddled in a burrito wrap, which mimicked a
splint, Herman doubted that the symptoms of a
broken leg could be hidden from a vigilant caretaker
from Wednesday to Saturday.
| 14 Mother and Father called a number of
witnesses. David Ingebretsen, an expert in the field
of bio-mechanical engineering, testified that the
fracture pattern was consistent with the forces
identified by the walker incident. Debbie Hosseini,
a registered nurse who works with the early
intervention program helping premature babies with
their development, had come to Z.D.'s home every
month to observe him. She testified that he was a
very happy baby, alwjays smiling, and very easy to
console. She never saw any bruising or swelling on
Z.D.
| 15 Finally, Dr. Steven Scott, an expert in
pediatric orthopedics, gave extensive testimony.
Scott testified that the femur fracture did not follow
the typical pattern of nonaccidental trauma, and he
disagreed with Herman as to the probable
mechanism. After examining the fracture pattern,
and feeling that it did not fit the typical pattern that
is normally seen with nonaccidental trauma, he
wanted to know if there was an explanation for the
fracture that fit the fracture pattern. Scott believed
that the fracture pattern required a marriage of two
forces in the same mechanism. He thought that
Grandmother's walker demonstration "mimicked the
forces exactly that would be needed to produce the
fracture pattern." As to the force, he testified that
there is no real way to know how *44 much force
is required to break a bone on a particular person,
but the walker incident created a leverage force, and
leverage forces create great force when little force is
applied. Additionally, the area of the bone where
the fracture occurred was a weaker area of the
femur, and Z.D.'s delayed bone age gave him a
weaker bone because it had less mass and was
composed of immature woven bone, making it
structurally weak.
| 16 In discussing the symptoms of a fracture,
Scott agreed with Herman that bone pain is typically

worse with any kind of manipulation or movement,
but thought that in a child of Z.D.'s age, symptoms
would be more generalized fussiness, irritability,
crying, and lack of movement of his leg. He also
explained that wrapping Z.D. in a burrito wrap
would influence a caretaker's ability to detect
symptoms because swaddling is exactly what
happens when a child has a splint. Scott's opinion
as to the onset of symptoms was also different from
Herman's. Scott did not find it remarkable for three
days to elapse before Mother and Father noticed
symptoms of the fracture. As examples, Scott said
that in the eighteen years he had been involved in
taking care of children's fractures, it was not
uncommon to see even a verbal child brought in two
or three days after the injury because the parents
attributed the symptoms to something else. He had
also seen nonverbal children who had fractures for
days, or even more than a week, before caretakers
(or medical professionals) realized there was a
problem that required medical attention. Scott
pointed to the numerous physicians who examined
Z.D. at Primary and described him as cheerful,
interactive, alert, and fussy, but consolable. At the
hospital, Z.D. presented neither localized nor
generalized symptoms. Further, at least six physical
examinations of Z.D. specifically noted that there
were no skin lesions, bruises, lacerations, abrasions,
burns, or scars. Scott concluded that if the
mechanism that caused the fracture were a direct
force, as Herman believed it to be, then he would
expect bruising around the leg because the force it
takes to bruise soft tissues is less than the force it
takes to break a bone. On the other hand, with the
walker incident, the amount of force needed to be
applied to the skin in order for the femur to fracture,
is well below the amount required to bruise the skin.
He also cited a study where over ninety percent of
the children with suspected nonaccidental fractures
also had soft tissue injuries.
f 17 After receiving all of the evidence, the
juvenile court found that Herman "unequivocally
testified that the femur fracture was the result of
non-accidental trauma, and would have required
significant and excessive force to cause such a
complex femur fracture." The court was convinced
that the fracture occurred on Saturday when Z.D.
was in Father's care because the court was both
"astonished and dumbfounded" as to why the
symptoms would be absent on Wednesday,
Thursday, Friday, and on Saturday morning, "but
yet make such a sudden and demonstrative
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Ouimette raises closer questions concerning its testimonial
nature, Defendant cannot now complain of error he invited by
entering the report into evidence.

For these reasons, the

decision of the trial court is affirmed.

When Allred made the statements that were admitted through
Sanders, she was not in police custody, was not responding to a
police inquiry, and was not providing the information for use in
a prosecution or investigation.

Her statement, "Oh my God,

there's Rocky," was simply a factual statement made in surprise
when she first noticed defendant. Furthermore, it was not made to
an agent of the police or prosecution and therefore "bears little
resemblance to the civil-law abuses the Confrontation
targeted."
N.E.2d at

Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51.

Clause

See also Hammon, 829

, 2005 Ind. LEXIS 541, at *24 ("A spontaneous

exclamation by a victim to a friend, family member, or co-worker
is not likely to be regarded as testimonial.").

The statement that Defendant had threatened to kill her was
made by Allred when Sanders was reporting the incident to the 911
dispatcher.

Allred can be heard on the tape of the 911 call that

was played to the jury.4

Although this statement was made to

4.
Defendant argues, however, the Allred's statement that
Defendant had threatened to kill her was inaudible and that even
Sanders was unable to understand it.
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appearance on the afternoon of the same day."
| 18 The court concluded that Z.D. was abused and
neglected while in Father's care, and that A.D. was
a neglected child as a result of being in the same
home as Z.D. See Utah Code Ann. §
78-3a-103(l)(s)(i)(E) (2002). Z.D. and A.D. were
removed from the home. The court ordered DCFS
to submit a reunification service plan. (FN4) Father
and Mother appeal the trial court's adjudication.
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
[1] f 19 Father argues that the juvenile court erred
in finding that the State established abuse by clear
and convincing evidence. See Utah R. Juv. P.
41(b). The standard for assessing whether evidence
is "clear and convincing" has been articulated as
follows:
While it rests primarily with the trial court to
determine whether the evidence is clear and
convincing, its finding is not necessarily
conclusive, for in cases governed by the rule
requiring such evidence the sufficiency of the
evidence to support the finding should be
considered by the appellate *45 court in the light
of that rule.... In such cases it is the duty of the
appellate court in reviewing the evidence to
determine, not whether the trier of facts could
reasonably conclude that it is more probable that
the fact to be proved exists than that it does not, ...
but whether the trier of facts could reasonably
conclude that it is flighty probable that the fact
exists.
Lovett v. Continental Bank & Trust Co., 4 Utah 2d
76, 286 P.2d 1065, 1068 (1955) (quotations and
citations omitted) (emphasis added). "An appellate
court does not give factual determinations made by a
trial judge the same amount of deference given to
factual determinations made by a jury-that is, an
appellate court does not, as a matter of course,
resolve all conflicts in the evidence in favor of the
appellee." Alta Indus, v. Hurst, 846 P.2d 1282,
1284 n. 2 (Utah 1993) (citations omitted).
ANALYSIS
I. Type of Fracture
[2] | 20 Even disregarding the testimony of defense
witnesses Ingebretsen and Scott, who both testified

Page 5
that the fracture pattern was consistent with the
forces identified by the walker incident, the
remaining evidence presented varying opinions as to
the probable mechanism. (FN5) Contrary to the
court's finding, Herman's testimony was anything
but "unequivocal." He testified that he could only
be "51/49" percent certain that the fracture was
caused by a significant axial force applied to a bent
knee. This testimony, standing alone, is far from
clear and convincing. Further, neither one of the
State's own witnesses-Smith and Nixon-bolstered
the opinion of Herman. Although Smith refrained
from estimating the degree of force required, he
thought the fracture could have resulted from the
walker incident. Nixon thought the probable cause
of the fracture was angular leverage.
| 21 As explained by both Scott and Ingebretsen,
and uncontested by any of the State's witnesses, if
the mechanism causing the fracture is assumed to be
the result of an axial load, then more force would be
required to cause the fracture than would be
required by the leverage force created by the walker
incident. None of the expert witnesses could
provide an opinion as to how much force would be
required to cause the fracture with either an axial
load or the walker incident.
II. Age of Fracture
K 22 Both Wednesday and Saturday fall within the
time period identified by the experts as to when the
fracture likely occurred; thus, this factor does not
help to establish that the fracture occurred on
Saturday.
III. Symptoms Associated with Fracture
If 23 There was a great deal of conflicting evidence
associated with the type and timing of symptoms.
The court was "both astonished and dumbfounded"
as to why the symptoms would be absent on
Wednesday, Thursday, Friday, and Saturday
morning, and "yet make such a sudden and
demonstrative appearance on the afternoon of the
same day." Yet, the court also recognized that
Father saw very little of Z.D. on Wednesday,
Thursday, and Friday, so that when the symptoms
seemed to Father to "suddenly appear" on Saturday,
Father had no way of comparing the symptoms
exhibited on Saturday with the symptoms exhibited
in the days prior. Further, the court did not
acknowledge that Mother had given Z.D. regular
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statements nontestimonial where declarants did not make them in
belief that they might be used at trial later) ; United States v.
Saget, 377 F.3d 223, 228 (2d Cir. 2004) (finding that Crawford
suggests that the declarant's awareness or expectation that his
or her statement may be later used at trial is a determinative
factor in assessing whether the statement is testimonial) .
also Hammon v. State, 829 N.E.2d 444,
at **30-31 ("[A]

See

, 2005 Ind. LEXIS 541,

'testimonial' statement is one given or taken in

significant part for purposes of preserving it for potential
future use in legal proceedings.").

Statements Challenged by Defendant :

In this case, Defendant

objects to the admission of certain testimony from Sanders and to
the report of Officer Ouimette.

Sanders testified that Allred

exclaimed, "Oh my God, there's Rocky," when she first noticed him
after the movie.3

He also testified that, while the

confrontation was in progress and he was on the telephone with
the 911 dispatcher, Allred stated that Defendant had just
threatened to kill her. It appears that under any definition
suggested in Crawford these statements were not testimonial when
made by Allred and can be admitted if they fall within a firmlyrooted hearsay objection. Although the police report of Officer

3. Although Defendant challenged the admissibility of this
statement in his brief on appeal, he conceded at oral argument
that it was not testimonial.
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doses of Tylenol on Wednesday, Thursday, and
Friday, with the last dose being given at
approximately 4:00-5:00 a.m. on Saturday. Even
then, the court was not persuaded that "minimal
doses of minor pain killers" could mask Z.D.'s
symptoms.
Yet, the State's witness, Sipher,
testified that Tylenol may very well influence
whether a caretaker is able to detect *46. symptoms
of an injury. Herman testified that children with
fractures are prescribed something stronger than
Tylenol or ibuprofen for pain, and he was surprised
to find that the emergency department had initially
given Z.D. only Tylenol after discovering the
fracture.
f 24 The court fbund that "[m]edical experts
testified and generally agreed that the pain and the
symptoms attendant to the leg fracture would be
significant and that the fracture would be extremely
painful"; further, that the symptoms would be
"readily detectable and observable by a caretaker."
Yet the court made no mention of Sipher's testimony
that it would not be surprising for the caretakers to
attribute Z.D.'s fussiness to teething. Defense
witness, Scott, testified that, in his eighteen years of
treating children's fractures, it was not uncommon
for nonverbal children, in the charge of medical
professionals, to go for days, or even a week, after
sustaining a fracture before receiving treatment
because the medical professionals did not realize that
a fracture had occurred. The court found that
Father described Z.D.'s symptoms as significant,
and that the hospital physicians and other doctors
confirmed this description. Yet, Scott pointed to the
medical reports from Primary itself, wherein Z.D.
was described as cheerful, interactive, alert, and
fussy, but consolable. Even when the first doctor at
Primary examined Z.D. and moved his leg, he could
not find anything wrong.
f 25 Perhaps the most significant symptom was the
one not present. Noticeably removed from the
court's findings and the State's case entirely, is any
mention of, or explanation for, the absence of
external injuries. Z.D. sustained no lesions, welts,
bruising, swelling, redness, burns, abrasions,
lacerations, or scars] If the fracture were caused by
an axial load, the mechanism believed by some State
witnesses to be the probable cause, it would almost
always be accompanied by a soft tissue injury like
bruising or swelling
i

f 26 Because the "explanations as to the cause of

Page 6
the injury provided by the parents [was] inconsistent
with the medical testimony," the court determined
that clear and convincing evidence had established
that the fracture occurred on Saturday afternoon
while Z.D. was in Father's care. However, we
cannot say that, given the evidence presented, "the
trier of facts could reasonably conclude that it [was]
highly probable" that the fracture was the result of
nonaccidental trauma inflicted by Father on Saturday
afternoon. Lovett v. Continental Bank & Trust Co.,
4 Utah 2d 76, 286 P.2d 1065, 1068 (1955).
CONCLUSION
1f 27 The evidence does not clearly and
convincingly establish that Z.D.'s fracture was
caused by an axial load sometime on Saturday when
he was in Father's care.
f 28 We therefore reverse.
1 29 WE CONCUR: JUDITH M. BILLINGS,
Presiding Judge and WILLIAM A. THORNE JR.,
Judge.
(FN1.) The trial court received evidence on thirteen
different days, spanning the time from March 21,
2003 to June 12, 2003.
Undoubtedly, this
elongated trial made it difficult for the trial judge to
recall the evidence and to place it all in context.
(FN2.) Because of the abuse referral, Z.D. was
admitted to the hospital.
(FN3.) During trial, when asked about his response
to Grandmother's inquiry, Herman testified that he
did not feel that the walker incident would have
created the appropriate mechanism, or the
appropriate kind of force, to cause the fracture.
(FN4.) Father and Mother successfully completed
their service plan.
DCFS involvement was
eventually terminated, and the children were
returned to the custody of Father and Mother
without condition.
(FN5.) Scott agreed that an axial load could cause
such a fracture.
He described two possible
scenarios: 1) the child stands with locked knees
and is then slammed down or dropped, so that the
force passes through the feet and into the knee and
femur; and 2) the child experiences a blow to the
end of the knee, directly over the kneecap. He
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justices of the peace in England." The abuse of those
examinations was, in large part, the impetus for the Sixth
Amendment right of a defendant to confront the witnesses against
him.

Id.

Because the questioning of Wife was a police

interrogation, it fell within any of the proposed definitions of
testimonial and did not require further refinement of that
standard.

Since the decision in Crawford, a number of courts have
attempted to define "testimonial."

In United States v. Summers,

Nos. 04-2121 & 04-2195, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 14823 (10th Cir.
July 21, 2005), the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit found that statements made by a co-defendant after he had
been taken into physical custody but before he had been informed
of his Miranda rights were testimonial.

In reaching that

conclusion, the Tenth Circuit held that "a statement is
testimonial if a reasonable person in the position of the
declarant would objectively foresee that his statement might be
used in the investigation or prosecution of the crime."

2005

U.S. App. LEXIS 14823, at *32 (citing United States v. Cromer,
389 F.3d 662, 675 (6th Cir. 2004) (adopting definition of
testimonial based on whether a reasonable person in declarant's
position would anticipate the statement being used against the
accused in investigating and prosecuting the crime)); United
States v. Hendricks, 395 F.3d 173, 181 (3d Cir. 2005) (holding
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explained that the first instance was unlikely
because Z.D., as a nonambulatory child, did not
have the muscle tone to stand and lock his knees.
Additionally, the fracture pattern did not match that
scenario.
The second instance was unlikely
because a direct blow strong enough to fracture a
bone should leave a contusion, swelling, or welt
over the kneecap. Again, the fracture pattern was
not consistent with such a mechanism.

© 2005 Thomson/West. No claim to original U.S. Govt, works.

such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or
confessions."

Id. at 51-52 (quoting White v. Illinois, 502 U.S.

346, 365 (1992) (Thomas, J., joined by Scalia, J., concurring in
part and concurring in judgment)).

The last definition

considered by the Crawford majority was suggested by the National
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers as amici

curiae:

"statements that were made under circumstances which would lead
an objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement
would be available for use at a later trial."

Id. at 52.

The Supreme Court held that the recorded statement of
Crawford's wife fell within even the most narrow definition
suggested because it was made
while in police custody, herself a potential
suspect in the case. Indeed, she had been
told that whether she would be released
"depend[ed] on how the investigation
continues." App. 81. In response to often
leading questions from police detectives, she
implicated her husband in Lee's stabbing and
at least arguably undermined his self-defense
claim.
541 U.S. at 65.

The Crawford Court held that some statements

qualify as testimonial under any definition.
of statements are ex parte

Among those types

testimony at a preliminary hearing and

"statements taken by police officers in the course of
interrogations."

Id. at 52.

The Court concluded that "[p]olice

interrogations bear a striking resemblance to examinations by
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